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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIFE 
KEVIN M. BARRY* 
Abstract: For over forty years, the Supreme Court has held that the death 
penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. But the Court has never addressed—let alone decided—whether the 
death penalty per se deprives the fundamental right to life in violation of sub-
stantive due process. The legal literature has followed suit, scarcely address-
ing the issue. This Article makes the case for why the death penalty violates 
the fundamental right to life. It first argues that the condemned have a funda-
mental right to life based on a history and tradition of diminished support for 
the death penalty nationally and worldwide, the dignity of the condemned, and 
the negative right not to be killed by one’s government. It next argues that the 
death penalty deprives this right in violation of substantive due process be-
cause the State cannot prove that the death penalty is narrowly tailored to 
achieve deterrence or retribution. Arbitrariness, delay, and unreliability de-
prive the death penalty of a compelling purpose, and execution belies narrow 
tailoring. Lastly, this Article argues that the right-to-life challenge is not in-
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s text or the elephant in the room: abor-
tion rights. Although the Eighth Amendment has paved the road toward judi-
cial abolition of the death penalty, there remains no end in sight, no welcome 
sign on the horizon. The road less traveled is substantive due process—the 
right to life of the condemned. On the long road toward abolition, this Article 
argues that two lanes are better than one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I will be appointing pro-life judges.”1 
For well over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the funda-
mental right to life under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 But it has 
never squarely addressed whether the death penalty per se deprives this 
right in violation of substantive due process.3 Over forty years ago, in the 
landmark case of Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court rejected a per se 
challenge to the death penalty on the grounds that it did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.4 Nei-
ther Gregg nor its progeny ever mentioned the right to life.5 
This omission is in stark contrast to two powerful and relatively recent 
traditions—one secular, the other religious—that oppose the death penalty 
on right-to-life grounds. The first is international human rights law, which 
for over thirty years has declared the death penalty a violation of two of its 
central tenets—the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and, im-
portantly, the fundamental right to life.6 “[S]ince 1989[,] . . . there has been 
a revolution in the” worldwide debate over the death penalty, from “the 
view that each nation has, if it wishes, the sovereign right to retain the death 
penalty as a repressive tool of its domestic criminal justice system,” to the 
view that “the death penalty . . . inevitably, and [no matter how] adminis-
tered,” violates “the most fundamental of human rights—the right to life.”7 
As of December 31, 2018, 142 countries have abandoned the death penalty 
explicitly or in practice.8 
The second tradition that opposes the death penalty on right-to-life 
grounds is religious teaching—particularly that of the Catholic Church. For 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Aaron Blake, The Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated, WASH. POST (Oct. 
19, 2016) (quoting then-presidential candidate Donald Trump), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-final-trump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.b815
198c005e [https://perma.cc/9XTB-B7AZ]. 
 2 See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856–58 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); see also infra note 108 (collecting cases regarding the fundamental right to life). 
 3 See Brief of the Ctr. for Constitutional Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 2, Zagorski v. Tennessee, 137 S. Ct. 1814 (2017) (No. 16-7576) [hereinafter 
Zagorski Amic. Br.]. 
 4 428 U.S. 153, 168–69 (1976). 
 5 See id.; see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (citing Gregg). 
 6 ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 
16–17 (5th ed. 2015). 
 7 Id.; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
27 (2003). 
 8 See infra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing international opposition to the death 
penalty based on, inter alia, the death penalty’s inconsistency with the right to life). 
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over twenty years, Catholic social teaching has opposed the death penalty in 
nearly all circumstances as inconsistent with promoting a culture of life.9 In 
2018, Pope Francis made history by proclaiming that the death penalty was, 
always and everywhere, “inadmissible” because human life “is always sa-
cred in the eyes of the [C]reator.”10 Many evangelical Christians have added 
their voices in opposition to the death penalty on pro-life grounds, as have 
religious conservatives in state legislatures throughout the country.11 
The Supreme Court’s failure to engage with the right to life in the 
death penalty context contrasts not only with human rights and religious 
traditions but also with recent changes in the legal and political landscape. 
In 2015, in the landmark case of Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment grants same-sex couples the funda-
mental right to marry.12 Although many commentators have debated Ober-
gefell’s implications for the criminalization of polygamy, assisted suicide, 
and even incest, none have suggested its implications for the death penal-
ty.13 This is not surprising; with only a handful of exceptions over the past 
several decades, the legal literature has followed the example of the Su-
preme Court in ignoring a substantive due process challenge to the death 
penalty premised on the fundamental right to life.14 But Obergefell’s impli-
cations for the death penalty are real; if the Fourteenth Amendment reaches 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 186, 261–264 and accompanying text. 
 10 Morgan Gstalter, Pope Francis Changes Capital Punishment Teaching, Now Finds Death 
Penalty Inadmissible, THE HILL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/400025-pope-
francis-changes-capital-punishment-teaching-now-finds-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/XW45-
3CMB] (quoting Pope Francis). 
 11 See infra notes 203–206 and accompanying text. 
 12 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 13 See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, The Constitutionality of Laws Banning Physician Assisted 
Suicide, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 395 (2017); Y. Carson Zhou, The Incest Horrible: Delimiting the 
Lawrence v. Texas Right to Sexual Autonomy, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 187 (2016); Amberly N. 
Beye, Comment, The More, the Marry-er? The Future of Polygamous Marriage in the Wake of 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 197 (2016). 
 14 See, e.g., James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under 
State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1335–37 (1989) (discussing substantive due process 
challenge to death penalty); N.B. Smith, The Death Penalty as an Unconstitutional Deprivation of 
Life and the Right to Privacy, 25 B.C. L. REV. 743 (1984) [hereinafter Smith, Deprivation of Life] 
(same); Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due Process 
Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1355–56 (2003) (same); see also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26–27, Zagorski v. Tennessee, No. 16-7576 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) 
(“Just as no state can deny the fundamental right to marry, a fortiori, no state can deny the funda-
mental right to life, which is the fundamental human right and provides the predicate for the exer-
cise of all other rights. Under Obergefell and the Fourteenth Amendment, the death sentence can-
not stand, as it violates a fundamental right, while simultaneously depriving the individual of all 
human dignity and personhood.”); cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, Capital Punishment and the Right to 
Life, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 505 (examining the “natural right to life” in philosophical liter-
ature and its implications for the death penalty). 
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the most intimate associations of our lives, it ought to reach our lives as 
well.15 
The Court’s silence is also at odds with politics—particularly, the chang-
ing composition of the Supreme Court. On the campaign trail and as presi-
dent-elect, Donald Trump promised to appoint “pro-life” Justices to the 
Court.16 His first nominee, Neil Gorsuch, fits that mold. Prior to assuming the 
bench, Justice Gorsuch wrote that “human life is fundamentally and inherent-
ly valuable” and therefore “inviolab[le],” although he carefully avoided ap-
plying this view to the death penalty, which, he said, “raise[d] unique ques-
tions all [its] own.”17 Defending himself against charges of sexual assault 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Trump’s second nominee, Brett Ka-
vanaugh, repeatedly invoked his devotion to the Catholic Church, which 
opposes the death penalty.18 Both Justices thus have firm ideological rea-
sons to engage with the right to life in the death penalty context. Given the 
bitter public debate surrounding the Court’s legitimacy in the wake of Jus-
tice Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings,19 these Justices also have an insti-
tutional reason to engage: a majority decision declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional on right-to-life grounds would be a historic exemplar of 
non-partisan decision-making. Such a decision would, in the words of Jus-
tice Elena Kagan, “enable[] the [C]ourt to look as though it was not owned 
by one side or another, and was indeed impartial and neutral and fair.”20 In 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (“[D]ecisions concerning marriage are among the most 
intimate that an individual can make.”). 
 16 See Blake, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 17 NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 157, 272 n.2 (2d 
prtg. 2009). 
 18 Kavanaugh Hearing Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utm_term=.f0006fbd3f76 
[https://perma.cc/3T47-QBE8] (“[F]or me, going to church on Sundays was like brushing my 
teeth, automatic. It still is.”); see infra note 263–264 and accompanying text (discussing the Cath-
olic Church’s opposition to the death penalty). On President Trump’s list of potential future nomi-
nees is Amy Coney Barrett, who has expressed the belief that “Catholic judges . . . are morally 
precluded from enforcing the death penalty” because it violates the “dignity” and “sanctity of 
human life.” John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. 
REV. 305, 308 (1998). 
 19 The Editorial Board, Brett Kavanaugh Joins a Supreme Court Challenged with Legitimacy, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/10/08/brett-kavanaugh-
joins-supreme-court-challenged-legitimacy-editorials-debates/1558899002/ [https://perma.cc/SSE8-
BDJC]. 
 20 Ezra Austin, Sotomayor on the Supreme Court: “We Have to Rise Above Partisanship,” 
WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/06/sotomayor-
supreme-court-we-have-rise-above-partisanship/?utm_term=.f902dbaa2df1 [https://perma.cc/58KF-
P6FT]; see also Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Playing the Long Game for the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/supreme-court-conserva-
tives-progressives.html [https://perma.cc/LQJ3-JLCL] (recalling “a time when not every decision 
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the political thicket we call the “culture wars,” the death penalty is low-
hanging fruit. 
Given these developments, the time is right to break the silence. When 
the Court eventually confronts the validity of the death penalty per se, it 
should speak to the fundamental right to life under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. This Article makes the case for why the death penalty de-
prives that right in violation of substantive due process. 
Part I briefly discusses some of the obvious limitations of an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the death penalty per se as compared to the right 
to life challenge—namely, Gregg’s holding, the plaintiff’s burden of proof, 
and a resistant Supreme Court.21 Building on Kenji Yoshino’s work, Part II 
traces the contours of the Supreme Court’s evolving substantive due process 
inquiry after Obergefell. Although not a model of clarity or consistency, 
four factors guide the analysis: (1) the specificity with which the right is 
framed; (2) history and tradition of the asserted right; (3) whether the right 
implicates dignity; and (4) the distinction between positive and negative 
rights.22 Applying these factors, Part III posits a fundamental right to life of 
condemned prisoners based on: a history and tradition of restriction and re-
gionalization of the death penalty in this Nation and throughout the world; the 
dignity of the condemned, as articulated by federal and state judges, moral 
philosophy, human rights, and religious teaching; and the negative character 
of the right at issue, namely, the freedom to not be killed by one’s govern-
ment.23 Part III argues that the State cannot meet its burden of proving that 
the death penalty is narrowly tailored to achieve deterrence or retribution 
because the imposition of the death penalty is marred by arbitrariness, de-
lay, and unreliability, and because execution is the antithesis of narrow tai-
loring. 
Part IV addresses some likely counterarguments to the recognition of a 
fundamental right to life for the condemned—from textualist claims about 
its constitutionality to feminist claims about its wisdom.24 
                                                                                                                           
was foreordained and ideology did not always reign supreme at the Supreme Court”); Debra Cas-
sens Weiss, Chief Justice Addresses ‘Contentious Events,’ Says Supreme Court Serves One Na-
tion, Not One Party, ABA J. (Oct. 17, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_
justice_addresses_contentious_events_says_supreme_court_serves_one_na [https://perma.cc/7PAZ-
NFQN] (“[W]e do not serve one party or one interest. . . . We serve one nation.” (quoting Chief 
Justice Roberts)). 
 21 See infra notes 25–41 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 42–102 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 103–313 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 317–364 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
Analysis of why the death penalty violates substantive due process un-
der the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments begins with a straightforward 
observation: according to the Supreme Court, the death penalty does not 
currently violate the Eighth Amendment.25 Although five former and two 
current Supreme Court Justices—Arthur Goldberg, William Brennan, Thur-
good Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer, and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg—have made a powerful case for why the death penal-
ty is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, their argument has never com-
manded a majority.26 In 1976, in Gregg, the Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed for the first time whether “the punishment of death for the crime of 
murder is, under all circumstances, ‘cruel and unusual’ in violation of the 
Eighth [Amendment],” as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.27 Gregg answered this question in the negative, and its progeny have 
repeated this refrain.28 
Although the Court has never retreated from its holding in Gregg that 
the death penalty per se does not violate the Eighth Amendment, it has, in 
the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, “pecked” away at the death penalty, 
categorically prohibiting its application to people declared insane, people 
with intellectual disabilities, people under eighteen years of age at the time 
of the offense, and those whose crimes do not result in the death of the vic-
tim.29 Employing its now familiar two-prong “proportionality” framework, 
the Court has held that the execution of such people is cruel and unusual 
because: (1) it is unacceptable to contemporary society, as objectively de-
termined by states’ unwillingness to impose it; and (2) it serves no legiti-
mate penological purpose—namely, deterrence or retribution—as subjec-
tively determined by the Court.30 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168–69. 
 26 See infra notes 163–165, 272–278 and accompanying text (discussing cases regarding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty). 
 27 428 U.S. at 168. 
 28 Id. at 169; see, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (“We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, 
that capital punishment is constitutional.”). 
 29 See Mark Walsh, Death Revisited: Will the Supreme Court “Peck Away at” Capital Pun-
ishment?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2015, at 19 (quoting Justice Scalia’s comment from the bench during 
announcement of decision in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)) (“Maybe we should cele-
brate that these two justices [Breyer and Ginsburg] are trying to kill [the death penalty] outright 
rather than peck it to death.”); infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy v. Lou-
isiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)). 
 30 E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–13. 
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In 2015, the Supreme Court appeared on the verge of declaring the 
death penalty per se cruel and unusual and abolishing it altogether in Glos-
sip v. Gross. In a lengthy dissent from a 5-4 decision upholding Oklahoma’s 
lethal injection protocol, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated 
that it was “highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.”31 Approximately three months later, and shortly before his death, 
conservative jurist Antonin Scalia told an audience of college students that 
four of his colleagues on the Court believed that the death penalty was un-
constitutional and that he “wouldn’t be surprised” if the Court abolished 
it.32 With Justice Scalia’s passing in February 2016 and the prospect of a 
Hillary Clinton presidency in November of that year, the death penalty’s 
days appeared numbered.33 The election of populist and pro-death-penalty 
president, Donald Trump, in November 2016, and his appointment of con-
servative jurist, Justice Neil Gorsuch, to the Court in April 2017, proved 
otherwise.34 With the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy and the ap-
pointment of conservative jurist, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, to the Court, 
Gregg’s holding will likely remain law for some time, especially given that 
the two most senior members of the Court are liberal jurists Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg (age eighty-six) and Stephen Breyer (age eighty).35 
In contrast to the Eighth Amendment argument, the Supreme Court has 
never squarely addressed whether the death penalty per se deprives criminal 
defendants of the fundamental right to life in violation of substantive due 
process. Gregg was an Eighth Amendment decision—not a substantive due 
process decision.36 
Indeed, the only mention of due process in Gregg relates to the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of procedural due process and the 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776–77. 
 32 Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Says He ‘Wouldn’t Be Surprised’ if SCOTUS Overturns the 
Death Penalty, ABA J. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_says_he_
wouldnt_be_surprised_if_scotus_overturns_the_death_penalty [https://perma.cc/L3N9-Z726]. 
 33 Robert J. Smith, The End of the Death Penalty?, SLATE (July 1, 2015), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/07/death_penalty_at_the_supreme_court_ken
nedy_may_vote_to_abolish_capital_punishment.html [https://perma.cc/P628-2PFP]; see also 
Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 391 (2017) [here-
inafter Barry, Dignity Clauses] (predicting prior to the November 2016 presidential election that 
the Court would abolish the death penalty). 
 34 See, e.g., Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 547 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Alito & Gorsuch, JJ.) (arguing against the remand of death penalty case involving evidence of 
racial bias). 
 35 Current Members, Justices, About the Court, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/TL3E-J9RM]. 
 36 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168–69. 
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Court’s holding in McGautha v. California that standardless jury sentencing 
procedures do not violate this guarantee.37 
Although the concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substan-
tive due process are substantially similar in cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty per se, they are not the same. Under the Eighth 
Amendment, the prisoner bears the “heavy burden” of proving that the 
death penalty is “without justification and thus is . . . unconstitutionally se-
vere.”38 By contrast, “the substantive due process argument is stated in the 
following manner: because capital punishment deprives an individual of a 
fundamental right (i.e., the right to life), the State needs a compelling inter-
est to justify it.”39 Critically, the State bears the burden of proving that the 
death penalty is narrowly tailored to serve the penological interests of retri-
bution or deterrence.40 
For over forty years, the Eighth Amendment has paved the road toward 
the abolition of the death penalty—but there remains no end in sight, no 
welcome sign on the horizon.41 The road less traveled is substantive due 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See id. at 177, 195–96 n.47 (discussing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185–86 
(1971), which rejected a procedural due process challenge based on standardless sentencing pro-
cedures); see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 275–76 (1998) (rejecting a 
procedural due process challenge based on inadequate clemency proceedings); Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 393, 407 n.6 (1993) (rejecting a procedural due process challenge based on a claim 
of innocence, and declining to consider a substantive due process challenge). 
 38 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175, 187. 
 39 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 40 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (noting two penological justifications for the death penalty: 
“retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. 
at 319)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 831 (5th ed. 
2015) (discussing the government’s burden of proof). This point regarding burdens of proof bears 
repeating. Although the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has repeatedly 
acknowledged that “the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment” and is 
therefore deserving of special consideration, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, the Court has never shifted 
the burden of proof to the State to demonstrate the death penalty’s validity. Conversely, in the 
substantive due process context, the State bears this burden. See also Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 
327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1975) (“[I]n order for the State to allow the taking of life by legisla-
tive mandate it must demonstrate that such action is the least restrictive means toward furtherance 
of a compelling governmental end.”); Smith, Deprivation of Life, supra note 14, at 752 (stating 
that substantive due process analysis “requires a determination whether a compelling state interest 
or a necessity on grounds of public health and safety exists to exact the death penalty” and 
“whether a lesser penalty would adequately serve the states’ claimed interest. . . . [T]he burden of 
proof is on the state and not the accused.”). See generally Zagorski Amic. Br., supra note 3, at 6–
7. 
 41 Although judicial abolition under the Eighth Amendment is unlikely in the near term, the 
Eighth Amendment still has important work to do. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Case of 
Condemned Inmate Who Cannot Recall His Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/politics/supreme-court-death-penalty-dementia.html [https://perma.cc/
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process—the right to life of the condemned. Although this asserted right is 
not without obstacles, two lanes are better than one. The remainder of this 
Article takes up the right-to-life challenge. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS GENERALLY 
Substantive due process refers to “whether the government has an ade-
quate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.”42 The lit-
erature on substantive due process is legion, in large part because this area of 
the law implicates weighty questions concerning which rights are fundamen-
tal under our Nation’s charter and, more particularly, whether Supreme Court 
Justices—as opposed to the People, through their democratically-elected 
leaders—should be the ones to decide.43 For purposes of this Article, a brief 
summary of substantive due process will suffice. 
The Supreme Court’s analytical framework for evaluating substantive 
due process claims involves two primary inquiries. Section A discusses the 
first, which relates to the importance of the asserted right, that is, whether 
the right being deprived is fundamental.44 Section B discusses the second, 
which relates to the burden the State must meet to deprive this right. If the 
right is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies, which means that the state in-
terest must be compelling, and the law must be narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.45 If the right is not fundamental, rational basis review applies, 
which means the law will pass muster so long as it is rationally related to a 
legitimate purpose.46 
A. Is the Right Deprived Fundamental? 
For over a century, the Court has used a variety of broad formulations 
to describe what qualifies as a fundamental right.47 Applying these formula-
tions, the Court has found nearly all of the rights enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights—e.g., the First Amendment’s protection of speech, the Second 
                                                                                                                           
WD82-KEL7] (discussing a case pending before the Supreme Court involving an Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to executing people with dementia). 
 42 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 570. 
 43 See id. at 828–30; see also id. at 18 (“Originalists believe that the meaning of a constitu-
tional provision was set when it was adopted and that it can be changed solely by amendment; 
nonoriginalists believe that the Constitution’s meaning can evolve by amendment and by interpre-
tation.”) (emphasis added). 
 44 Id. at 828–30; see infra notes 47–98 and accompanying text. 
 45 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 830–31; see infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 46 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 828. 
 47 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759–61 (2010) (reviewing “different 
formulations” used by the Court to “describ[e] the boundaries of due process”). 
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Amendment’s right to bear arms, and the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures—to be fundamental and there-
fore applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.48 
The Court’s willingness to find unenumerated rights to be fundamental 
is far less settled.49 Debate over the judicial role, and between originalism 
and nonoriginalism, more specifically, figures prominently in the Court’s 
decisions.50 On one side of the debate are those Justices who narrowly con-
strue the Due Process Clause to protect a circumscribed set of rights firmly 
grounded in the “Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”51 Judicial 
restraint is a virtue in the uncharted waters of substantive due process, these 
Justices argue, lest “the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of th[e] Court.”52 
This was the approach taken by the majority in Washington v. Glucksberg 
and Reno v. Flores, in which the Court upheld laws prohibiting assisted sui-
cide and the detention of immigrant children, respectively.53 
On the other side of the debate are those Justices who favor a more 
flexible, common law approach “[ir]reduc[able] to any formula,” by which 
fundamental rights are discerned through the exercise of reasoned judg-
ment—aided, but not bound by, history and tradition.54 For these Justices, 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is a “bulwark[] . . . against 
                                                                                                                           
 48 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 6 n.13, 529. This process of applying the Bill of Rights to 
the States is known as “selective incorporation.” Id. at 6 n.13. 
 49 Examples of unenumerated rights include “rights protecting family autonomy, procreation, 
sexual activity and sexual orientation, medical care decision making, [and] travel.” Id. at 826; see 
also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
148–49 (2015) [hereinafter Yoshino, Freedom] (discussing the Court’s recognition of various 
unenumerated rights); see also infra notes 58–98 (discussing the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence). 
 50 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 829; see also id. at 17–26 (discussing the debate between 
originalism and nonoriginalism). 
 51 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997); id. at 720 (“[W]e ‘ha[ve] always 
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsi-
ble decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.’” (quoting Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))). 
 52 Id. at 720 (“By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, 
we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”); 
see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
11 (1971) (“[S]ubstantive due process, revived by the Griswold case, [381 U.S. 479 (1965),] is 
and always has been an improper doctrine.”). 
 53 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735–36; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993). 
 54 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The balance of which I 
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions 
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living 
thing.”). 
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arbitrary legislation,” and it is the duty of the Court—and only the Court—
to “protect[] the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its mean-
ing.”55 This was the approach famously laid down by Justice Harlan in his 
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, and invoked by a majority of the Court 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaf-
firmed the fundamental right to abortion, and, more recently, in Obergefell, 
which recognized same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry.56 
Although the Court’s unenumerated rights decisions—typified by 
Glucksberg and Obergefell—are not a model of clarity or consistency, four 
primary factors guide the Court’s inquiry: (1) the specificity with which the 
right is framed; (2) history and tradition of the asserted right; (3) whether 
the right implicates dignity; and (4) the distinction between positive and 
negative rights.57 
1. Specificity 
The level of specificity with which a right is framed is often determi-
native of the substantive due process inquiry; the more general the level of 
abstraction at which the right is defined, the more likely the Court is to find 
the right to be fundamental.58 
In Glucksberg, for example, the Court required a “careful description” 
of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.59 The interest at stake in that 
case was not a generalized “liberty to choose how to die” or “to make end-
                                                                                                                           
 55 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The identification and protection of 
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”); Poe, 367 
U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)). 
 56 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (same); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 769 (Souter, J., concurring) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (same); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (same); Yoshino, Freedom, 
supra note 49, at 150 (discussing Justice Harlan’s “balancing methodology that weighed individu-
al liberties against governmental interests in a reasoned manner. Such an approach always oc-
curred against the backdrop of tradition, but was not shackled to the past, not least because tradi-
tion was itself ‘a living thing.’”). 
 57 For an excellent discussion of the first, second, and fourth factors, see Yoshino, Freedom, 
supra note 49, at 163–69; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 829 (discussing three fac-
tors). In this Article, I supplement Professor Yoshino’s discussion with analysis of a fourth fac-
tor—dignity. See infra notes 78–93 and accompanying text; see also Barry, Dignity Clauses, su-
pra note 33, at 395–416 (comparing the Court’s analysis of dignity under the Eighth Amendment 
and substantive due process). 
 58 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 829 (“At a sufficiently general level of abstraction, 
any liberty can be justified as consistent with the nation’s traditions. At a very specific level of 
abstraction, few nontextual rights would be justified.”); Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 164–
66. 
 59 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
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of-life decisions,” or the “right to choose a humane, dignified death.”60 In-
stead, the Court reasoned the interest at stake was the “right to commit sui-
cide with another’s assistance.”61 So framed, the Court not surprisingly 
found no such fundamental right.62 The same was true in Flores, where the 
Court declined to frame the right of juvenile immigrants in INS detention as 
the “freedom from physical restraint,” and instead selected a far narrower 
frame: “the . . . right of a child . . . for whom the government is responsible, 
to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather 
than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institu-
tion.”63 
In Obergefell, by contrast, the Court broadly framed the asserted inter-
est as the “right to marry,” not the “right to same-sex marriage,” and invali-
dated laws that refused that right to same-sex couples.64 This broad framing 
was in keeping with earlier decisions, including Casey, which explicitly 
rejected “defin[ing rights] at the most specific level” and reaffirmed the 
right to abortion prior to viability.65 It was also consistent with Lawrence v. 
Texas, which struck down laws infringing the right to engage in private, 
consensual sexual activity.66 Notably, Lawrence’s invalidation of same-sex 
sodomy laws overruled a contrary holding in Bowers v. Hardwick years ear-
lier, which had framed the right narrowly: “the claimed constitutional right 
of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.”67 
2. History and Tradition 
The Court’s level of commitment to history and tradition is also key to 
determining the existence of a fundamental right.68 The more willing the 
Court is to look beyond history and tradition, the more likely it is to recog-
nize a fundamental right.69 In Glucksberg, for example, the Court noted a 
“consistent and almost universal tradition” among the states and throughout 
Anglo-American history 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 703. 
 61 Id. at 722–23. 
 62 See id. at 728. 
 63 Flores, 507 U.S. at 302. 
 64 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 65 Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. But see id. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right to 
abortion was not fundamental because, inter alia, “the Constitution says absolutely nothing about 
it”). 
 66 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003). 
 67 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
578. 
 68 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 829; Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 152, 164. 
 69 See Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 153–54, 164. 
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that has long rejected the asserted right [to assisted suicide], and 
continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, men-
tally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to 
reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down 
the considered policy choice of almost every State.70  
The Court declined to do so, upholding the state of Washington’s law pro-
hibiting physician-assisted suicide.71 
With Justice Kennedy at the helm, the Court in Obergefell took a dif-
ferent tack. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which struck 
down laws depriving gays and lesbians of the right to marry, “history and 
tradition guide and discipline th[e] [substantive due process] inquiry but do 
not set its outer boundaries.”72 For this proposition, Justice Kennedy cited 
his opinion for the Court in Lawrence, which made the same point when it 
struck down laws criminalizing gays’ and lesbians’ right to engage in pri-
vate, consensual sexual activity.73 “[H]istory and tradition are the starting 
point,” the Lawrence Court reasoned, “but not in all cases the ending point 
of the substantive due process inquiry.”74 That language in Lawrence, in 
turn, derives from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice 
O’Connor) in Lewis, in which he acknowledged a criminal suspect’s fun-
damental right to life.75 
According to these precedents, then, history and tradition are a bea-
con—not a mooring. They do not constrain the Court from looking beyond 
history and tradition to discern fundamental rights, for to do so would, ac-
cording to the Obergefell Court, “allow[] the past alone to rule the pre-
                                                                                                                           
 70 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; see also Flores, 507 U.S. at 303 (stating that “[t]he mere 
novelty of” a claimed right to be released from INS detention into the custody of a responsible 
adult “is reason enough to doubt that ‘substantive due process’ sustains it; the alleged right cer-
tainly cannot be considered ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental’”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (“Nor do the historical traditions of the American people support the view that the 
right to terminate one’s pregnancy is ‘fundamental.’”). 
 71 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
 72 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 73 Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572). 
 74 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 75 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging a right to life, but 
holding that this right was outweighed by state’s interest in “conduct[ing] a dangerous chase of a 
suspect who disobeys a lawful command to stop”). 
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sent.”76 Because “new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new gen-
erations,” the Court continued, 
[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our 
own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know 
the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrust-
ed to future generations a charter protecting the right of all per-
sons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.77 
3. Dignity 
Beyond history and tradition, “dignity” figures prominently in the 
Court’s assessment of whether a right is fundamental.78 Although the term is 
not explicitly defined in the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, 
its basic meaning is clear enough. Dignity, as conceived by the Court, refers 
to our intrinsic worth as human beings and the attendant freedom from be-
ing personally disparaged or humiliated.79 Where an asserted liberty interest 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598; see also id. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exer-
cised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and 
new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”). 
 77 Id. at 2598; see also id. at 2602 (“[R]ights come not from ancient sources alone.”); Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 
847 (rejecting the view “that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the 
most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified”). 
 78 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions 
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736–37 (2008); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: 
Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 22–23 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/
11/equal-dignity-speaking-its-name/ [https://perma.cc/AWN7-HNHW] (discussing dignity’s 
“considerable doctrinal pedigree,” which is “most apparent in the gay-rights triptych of Lawrence 
v. Texas, United States v. Windsor, and now Obergefell”); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation 
Principle and Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3083–84 (2014) [hereinafter Yoshino, 
Anti-Humiliation] (discussing the Court’s reliance on dignity in Lawrence and Casey). See gener-
ally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 176, 206–12 
(2011) (providing “a systematic account of dignity’s varied meanings” in Supreme Court opin-
ions, including those involving fundamental rights). 
 79 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 78, at 1737–39 (discussing dignity as “the inherent worth of a 
life” in the context of Fourteenth Amendment abortion jurisprudence); Yoshino, Anti-Humiliation, 
supra note 78, at 3076, 3082 (describing the Supreme Court’s invocation of “dignity” in the sub-
stantive due process context as an endorsement of “the anti-humiliation principle,” asking, “what, 
after all, is the opposite of ‘humiliation’ but ‘dignity’?”); see also William A. Parent, Constitu-
tional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
AMERICAN VALUES 47, 62 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (defining dignity 
as “a negative moral right not to be regarded or treated with unjust personal disparagement”); 
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151, 1164–65 (2004) (equating dignity to protection “from shame and humiliation”); cf. Furman 
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implicates dignity, that is, where its deprivation disparages or humiliates, 
the Court is more likely to find the interest to be fundamental.80 
The Court’s decisions involving abortion rights and the rights of gays 
and lesbians powerfully demonstrate dignity’s centrality to the substantive 
due process inquiry.81 In Casey, for example, the Court reaffirmed the fun-
damental right to abortion prior to viability, noting that the decision to termi-
nate a pregnancy is among those choices “central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy,” and therefore “central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”82 To deny a woman this right would deprive her of dignity, 
subjecting her “to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear.”83 The fact “[t]hat these sacrifices have from the beginning of 
the human race been endured by woman” did not undermine the recognition 
of such a right.84 In the words of the majority: “[a woman’s] suffering is too 
intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vi-
sion of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the 
course of our history and our culture.”85 
In Obergefell, the Court relied on dignity to find a fundamental right of 
same-sex couples to marry.86 “The fundamental liberties protected by the 
. . . Due Process Clause,” the Court stated, “extend to certain personal 
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy.”87 The right of same-
sex couples to marry is fundamental, the Court reasoned, because it impli-
cates “dignity in the bond between two men or two women . . . and in their 
                                                                                                                           
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing dignity as one’s “in-
trinsic worth as [a] human being[]” in the context of Eighth Amendment death penalty jurispru-
dence). 
 80 See Yoshino, Anti-Humiliation, supra note 78, at 3087–88 (stating that the Supreme 
Court’s use of dignity “cannot be dismissed as quirk,” and observing that, “when Justice Kennedy 
ascribes dignity to an entity, that entity generally prevails”). Some commentators have suggested 
that dignity is, itself, a fundamental right. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitution-
al ‘Right to Dignity,’ THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/04/the-dangerous-doctrine-of-dignity/391796 [https://perma.cc/GM79-Q5PQ] (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence “constitutional[ized] . . . . the right to 
dignity,” which “may lead to results in the future that liberals come to regret” (emphasis added)). 
The better view is that dignity is not a fundamental right but is instead one of the elements of the 
substantive due process inquiry that yields such a right. See Barry, Dignity Clauses, supra note 33, 
at 395; see also Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006) (stating that dignity is not “a new right or value,” but 
rather is “a value underlying, or giving meaning to, existing constitutional rights and guarantees”). 
 81 See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text (citing Casey, Obergefell, and Lawrence). 
 82 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 83 Id. at 852. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 87 Id. 
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autonomy to make such profound choices.”88 By refusing to recognize these 
profound choices among same-sex couples, the state laws at issue denied 
same-sex couples “equal dignity”—“disrespect[ing] and subordinat[ing],” 
“demean[ing]” and “disparag[ing],” and “stigma[tizing]” and “injur[ing]” 
them.89 
And in Lawrence, the Court relied on dignity to find a fundamental 
right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity.90 Citing Casey, the 
Court stated that decisions involving private consensual sex are “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy” and, by extension, “central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 Accordingly, the Court struck 
down laws criminalizing same-sex intimacy because they deprived same-
sex couples of their “dignity as free persons”—subjecting them to “a life-
long penalty and stigma.”92 Notably, Lawrence explicitly overruled the 
holding of Bowers, decided nearly two decades earlier, which never men-
tioned dignity. 93 
4. Negative and Positive Rights 
Lastly, the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence turns on the famil-
iar distinction between negative and positive rights.94 As Justice Clarence 
Thomas put it, “[i]n the American legal tradition, liberty has long been un-
derstood as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a 
particular governmental entitlement.”95 Accordingly, the Court has declined 
to recognize a fundamental right to education and protection from child 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 2600. 
 89 Id.; see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770, 774 (2013) (holding that the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act’s exclusion of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages deprived 
same-sex couples of “dignity conferred by the States” in violation of “the liberty of the person 
protected by the Fifth Amendment”). 
 90 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 578–79. 
 91 Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 92 Id. at 567, 584 (citation omitted). 
 93 Id. at 578 (expressly overruling Bowers). The word “dignity” appeared only once in Bow-
ers—in Justice Stevens’ dissent upon which the Lawrence majority relied. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 
at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the recognition and protection of liberty is guided by 
“respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of conscience”), overruled by Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558. 
 94 See Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 159; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 
577 (discussing “deeply entrenched belief that the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties—
rights that restrain the government—and not a creator of affirmative rights to government ser-
vices”) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). 
 95 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 
(“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right 
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property 
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). 
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abuse in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, respective-
ly, while acknowledging the fundamental right to be free from government 
intrusion into one’s private decisions regarding contraceptives and consen-
sual sex in Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence, respectively.96 Although 
Obergefell arguably blurred this distinction by recognizing a fundamental 
right to marry (as opposed to freedom from civil or criminal penalties for 
marrying), “marriage has a somewhat distinctive feature of being both a 
positive and a negative right” involving governmental entitlements and a 
zone of privacy into which the government cannot intrude.97 Therefore, 
even after Obergefell, the positive/negative rights distinction likely remains 
a feature of the Court’s fundamental rights inquiry.98 
B. Does the Law Meet the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny? 
The second question the Court asks when evaluating substantive due 
process claims is whether the law satisfies the appropriate level of scrutiny, 
namely, strict scrutiny or rational basis.99 As Justice Thomas has stated, if 
the right is fundamental, “legislation trenching upon [it] . . . is subjected to 
‘strict scrutiny,’ and generally will be invalidated unless the State demon-
strates a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.”100 In short, “the gov-
ernment has the burden of persuading the Court that a truly vital interest is 
served by the law in question,” and that such interest could not be served 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 160–62 (discussing Rodriguez, DeShaney, Gris-
wold, and Lawrence). 
 97 Id. at 168; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimen-
sion of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, 
it does not follow that freedom stops there.”). 
 98 Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 168–69 (suggesting that Obergefell’s “eliding the 
negative/positive distinction” may “represent a ‘one-off’” rather than a radical departure from 
existing law). 
 99 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 828; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 728 (stat-
ing that “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty 
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest,” and that the deprivation of non-fundamental interests need only 
be “rationally related to legitimate government interests”) (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 302); ac-
cord Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 & n.9 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Although these lev-
els of scrutiny are “firmly established in the law,” the consistency with which the Court applies 
them is the subject of debate. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 568 (discussing criticism that 
Court inconsistently applies levels of scrutiny); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that plurality correctly invalidated state law infringing 
fundamental right but failed to “articulate[] the appropriate standard of review,” namely, “strict 
scrutiny”). 
 100 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 115 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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“through any means less restrictive of the right.”101 If the right is not fun-
damental, judicial scrutiny is “not exacting”; the legislation will pass consti-
tutional muster so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate interest, and 
regardless of the existence of a less restrictive alternative.102 
With this doctrinal foundation laid, this Article next argues that the 
death penalty deprives the fundamental right to life in violation of substan-
tive due process. 
III. THE DEATH PENALTY DEPRIVES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO  
LIFE IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of substantive 
due process, the government cannot deprive the fundamental right to life 
unless the deprivation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling pur-
pose.103 For the reasons that follow, the death penalty deprives condemned 
prisoners of the fundamental right to life in violation of substantive due pro-
cess. As discussed in Section A, the condemned’s right to life is fundamen-
tal because of: a history and tradition of restriction and regionalization of 
the death penalty; the dignity of the condemned, as articulated by federal 
and state judges, moral philosophy, human rights, and religious teaching; 
and the negative right at issue, namely, the freedom to not be killed by the 
State.104 Furthermore, as discussed in Section B, the death penalty is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve deterrence or retribution because its imposition 
is marred by arbitrariness, delay, and unreliability, and because execution 
belies narrow tailoring.105 
A. Condemned Prisoners’ Right to Life Is Fundamental 
Generally speaking, the fundamental nature of the right to life is not 
open to serious debate. Unlike unenumerated liberties such as marriage and 
intimacy that the Court has struggled to identify, life is explicit in the Con-
stitution’s Due Process Clauses, which reach back to Magna Carta.106 The 
right to life’s foundational pedigree, 
                                                                                                                           
 101 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 831. 
 102 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 115; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 831. 
 103 See supra notes 42–102 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 106–281 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental right to life 
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win, Abortion: A Woman’s Private Choice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1189, 1224–25 (2017) (discussing 
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derives . . . from the irreducible perception that life and the organ-
ic base on which it subsists are somehow sacred; it is . . . the pri-
mordial experience of being alive, of experiencing elemental sen-
sation of vitality and of fearing its extinction that generates the 
sense of sanctity that attaches to the living human being.107 
As the Supreme Court has observed in a range of contexts for well 
over a century, the right to life is “the right which comprehends all others”; 
it is, quite literally, “the right to have rights.”108 
In his concurring opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, made plain this right in the context of 
a motorcycle passenger accidentally killed by police during a high-speed 
chase.109 The passenger, Justice Kennedy wrote, had an “interest sufficient 
to invoke [substantive] due process,” namely, the “interest in life which the 
State, by the Fourteenth Amendment, is bound to respect.”110 
Stated at this broad level of abstraction, the right to life is a fundamen-
tal right that cannot be denied to anyone, including condemned prisoners, 
unless the law satisfies strict scrutiny.111 The critical question under this 
formulation, then, is not whether prisoners have a right to life, but rather 
                                                                                                                           
Supreme Court’s recognition of various unenumerated liberties under rubric of privacy), with U.S. 
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 107 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-12 (2d ed. 1988) (internal 
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 108 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 133 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); see, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
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generally Zagorski Amic. Br., supra note 3, at 4. 
 109 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 110 Id. at 857–58 (concluding that the right to life was outweighed by the “necessities of law 
enforcement . . . [to] conduct a dangerous chase of a suspect who disobeys a lawful command to 
stop”). 
 111 See id. at 856–58; cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 437 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992), in support of ar-
gument that execution of the innocent violates substantive due process). 
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whether death penalty laws are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.112 
If the right to life is stated at a more specific level of abstraction, how-
ever, discussion of fundamental rights requires a more in-depth analysis—
one to which this Article now turns. 
1. Specificity 
When described at a more specific level, the asserted right is not “the 
right to life” generally, but rather “the right to life of people condemned to 
death” or “the right of people convicted of murder not to be punished with 
death.”113 In determining whether such a narrowly defined right is funda-
mental, reliance on the plain letter of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and citation to Supreme Court precedents articulating a fundamental right to 
life are unlikely to suffice.114 At this more specific level of abstraction, the 
positive/negative rights distinction, history and tradition, and human dignity 
must be consulted.115 The remainder of this Section discusses each of these 
three elements in turn. The positive/negative rights distinction is straight-
forward and is therefore discussed only briefly; the latter two elements, 
which require more explanation, are examined in greater detail. 
2. Negative Right 
The distinction between positive and negative rights strongly supports 
the fundamental right to life of the condemned.116 As Chief Justice Roberts 
has stated, fundamental rights are not “a sword to demand positive entitle-
ments from the State,” but rather a “shield” from State power.117 In the 
death penalty context, Roberts’s words are more than mere metaphor. Those 
on death row seek not a sword, but rather a shield to protect them from the 
sword (or syringe) of the State.118 They claim the ultimate negative right: 
the right to not be killed by their government, the freedom from death at the 
hands of the State. Far less than “the right to be let alone” by one’s govern-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny standard). 
 113 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (requiring “careful description” 
of asserted right). 
 114 See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (discussing the text of Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, and Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing the right to life). 
 115 See supra notes 57–98 and accompanying text (discussing the four elements of the funda-
mental rights analysis). 
 116 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 
(discussing the distinction between positive and negative rights). 
 117 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 118 See id. 
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ment,119 they seek simply the right to be. In the pantheon of negative rights, 
the right to life is second to none.120 
3. History and Tradition 
At first blush, history and tradition appear to offer little support for the 
recognition of a fundamental right to life of the condemned.121 In 1976, in 
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court stated that, “the imposition of the death penalty 
for the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United 
States and in England.”122 But this sweeping conclusion from over forty 
years ago obscures a more complex history and tradition.123 Two central 
themes emerge. 
First, as Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in Furman v. 
Georgia, “although ‘the death penalty has been employed throughout our his-
tory,’ in fact the history of this punishment is one of successive restriction.”124 
The Nation’s road to abolition, though long and winding, has inevitably tend-
ed in one direction—toward reform and, in many states, abolition of the death 
penalty.125 As the Connecticut Supreme Court observed, “[s]ecularization, 
evolving moral standards, new constitutional and procedural protections, and 
the availability of incarceration as a viable alternative to execution have re-
sulted in capital punishment being available for far fewer crimes and crimi-
nals, and being imposed far less frequently, with a concomitant deteriora-
tion in public acceptance.”126 
Second, the states in which the death penalty has thrived throughout 
this Nation’s history share one common feature—they are all located in the 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 n.10 (1972) (quoted in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
 120 See Screws, 325 U.S. at 133 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (discussing “the right which com-
prehends all others, the right to life itself”). 
 121 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (discussing the role of history and tradition in substantive 
due process context). 
 122 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976). 
 123 Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (overruling the eighteen-year-old hold-
ing in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that upheld law criminalizing same-sex intima-
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 124 Furman, 408 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958)). 
 125 See infra notes 132–215 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the death penal-
ty in the United States). 
 126 State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 36 (Conn. 2015). 
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South.127 As Carol and Jordan Steiker have written, “[t]he history of the 
American death penalty has been one of broad-based change over time, 
yes—but it has also been a history of profound regional division that is still 
clearly visible in death penalty practices today.”128 The thirteen states that 
comprised the Confederacy, “that were last to abandon slavery and segrega-
tion, and that were most resistant to the federal enforcement of civil rights 
norms,” have carried out more than seventy-five percent of the Nation’s 
executions over the past four decades.129 Indeed, for over three centuries, 
the South has “consistently outstripped every other region in total number 
of executions, the majority of which were of black people.”130 Accordingly, 
the history and tradition of denying the condemned’s right to life is most 
closely associated with those states with a sordid history and tradition of 
enslaving and subordinating people of color.131 This correlation does not 
eviscerate the history and tradition that has supported the death penalty, but 
it does provide some essential context. 
This Subsection now turns to the history and tradition of the right to 
life of the condemned, as informed by the twin themes of restriction and 
regionalization. Given their significance to the substantive due process in-
quiry, history and tradition are discussed in some detail. 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. [hereinafter 
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a. Colonial America–Early 1950s: Northern Restriction and Southern 
Retention 
Brought to this continent by the earliest colonial governments, the 
death penalty, “once here, was tempered considerably.”132 By the late-
1600s, for example, English law recognized nearly fifty capital crimes; the 
average American colony recognized only twelve.133 Although all of the 
original colonies authorized the death penalty as the mandatory punishment 
for certain crimes, colonial governments did not always enforce the law.134 
In Connecticut, for example, “judges and juries often hesitated to enforce 
the capital laws as written. In many adultery cases, . . . courts avoided im-
posing the ultimate punishment by finding the parties not guilty but ‘highly 
suspicious,’ and thus imposing a sentence of something other than death.”135 
In other cases, prisoners were sentenced to “simulated hanging” (i.e., stand-
ing on the gallows for a half-hour with one’s neck in a noose) or given last-
minute reprieves.136 And, as in England, “the vast reach of the death penalty 
. . . was cabined by discretionary grants of mercy at all stages of the pro-
cess.” 137 
In the 1770s and 1780s, American newspapers reprinted Italian philos-
opher Cesare Beccaria’s 1764 treatise On Crimes and Punishments, a semi-
nal Enlightenment-era work that challenged the legitimacy of the death 
penalty and found widespread support in Europe and the United States.138 
From the 1790s to the 1860s, the abolitionist movement, “led variously by 
secular reformers and Quakers, Unitarians, and other liberal Christians,” 
succeeded in restricting the death penalty in the northern states by introduc-
ing degrees of murder, reducing the variety of crimes punishable by death, 
replacing mandatory death sentences with jury discretion, ending public 
executions, and completely abolishing the death penalty in Michigan 
(1847), Rhode Island (1852), and Wisconsin (1853).139 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Furman, 408 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 133 Id. at 335. 
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Significantly, these death penalty reforms “happened later, less com-
pletely, or not at all in the South,” due in large part “to the South’s historical 
practice of chattel slavery and of slavery’s enduring racial legacy long after 
the end of the Civil War.”140 For example, although many southern states, 
like their northern counterparts, reduced the number of crimes punishable 
by death, they did so only for whites—not blacks.141 Indeed, southern 
“slave codes” even compensated white slaveholders for the “taking” of exe-
cuted slaves.142 Public executions remained popular in southern states long 
after they were banned in the North, particularly when the execution in-
volved a black man convicted of raping a white woman.143 And, unlike sev-
eral of its northern counterparts, abolition of the death penalty proved im-
possible in the South because of the widely held belief that the death penal-
ty was needed to protect the white minority from violence by an enslaved 
black majority for whom incarceration was no deterrent.144 After the war, 
support for the death penalty persisted among white southerners who be-
lieved that the death penalty maintained order by deterring violence by “the 
newly freed and impoverished black population” and deterring the lynching 
of black people by whites.145 
In the years following the Civil War, slave codes gave way to “Black 
Codes,” which reinstated a dual system of criminal justice based explicitly 
on race, with the death penalty at its center.146 “As was the case under [slav-
ery], blacks . . . . were given harsher punishments than whites for commit-
ting similar offenses.”147 Although Reconstruction ended de jure discrimi-
nation under the Black Codes, it did not—and, indeed, could not—end de 
facto discrimination.148 As Phyllis Goldfarb has written, “[t]he past was not 
the past—it flourished in new forms.”149 Proponents of racial segregation 
turned to the criminal justice system, generally—and the death penalty, spe-
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cifically—as a tool of racial control.150 Racial discrimination, no longer ex-
plicit in the law, persisted in the administration of the death penalty under 
Jim Crow and continues to this day, with “death sentences . . . far more like-
ly to be handed down if the victim is white—even controlling for other fac-
tors.”151 
Although “the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor,” with 
“[s]ome of the attention previously given to abolition . . . diverted to prison 
reform,” the abolitionist movement pressed on with moderate success.152 
Declining rates of violent crime and increasing ambivalence over the retrib-
utive and deterrent value of the death penalty contributed to a wave of legis-
lative repeals in the late nineteenth century.153 Maine abolished the death 
penalty in 1876, restored it in 1883, and abolished it for good in 1887.154 
Iowa abolished the death penalty from 1872–1878, and Colorado followed 
from 1897–1901.155 The turn of the century saw the abolition of the death 
penalty in nine states, although all but two, North Dakota and Minnesota, 
restored the death penalty within just a few years.156 Notably, “for every 
state that abolished capital punishment during the first two decades of the 
century there were two that came close.”157 In 1919, executions dropped to 
just sixty-five—per capita, a new low.158 Although executions would soon 
soar to new heights amidst a “crime wave” generated by the Great Depres-
sion, reaching 200 by the late-1930s, abolitionist sentiment continued, lead-
ing to the development of ostensibly more humane methods of execution, 
namely electrocution and lethal gas, which were thought to be “as quick, 
painless, reliable, and as little disfiguring as possible.”159 
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b. Mid-1950s–Mid-1970s: Judicial Intervention 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the abolition movement 
achieved some of its greatest successes, as nine more states abolished the 
death penalty, public support for the death penalty dropped to historic lows, 
and annual executions declined sharply—ceasing completely in 1968.160 
Many mainstream religious organizations, including the American Baptist 
Church, the United Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church, the Unitarian 
Universalist Association of Congregations, the National Council on Church-
es, and Judaism’s Conservative, Reform and Reconstructionist movements, 
likewise registered their opposition to the death penalty at this time—a far 
cry from the Old Testament’s eye-for-an-eye justice championed by many 
religious groups over the past three centuries.161 Abolition’s greatest ac-
complishment during this period, however, took place not in legislative 
halls, empty execution chambers, or churches and synagogues, but rather in 
the courts.162 
On the heels of newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Arthur Gold-
berg’s groundbreaking dissent in the 1963 case of Rudolph v. Alabama, 
which called into question the constitutionality of the death penalty as ap-
plied to non-homicide crimes, a network of highly skilled lawyers at the 
ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund began challenging the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty per se.163 In the 1972 watershed case of 
Furman, the Supreme Court famously struck down all death penalty statutes 
then in force, holding that standardless jury discretion violated the Eighth 
Amendment.164 Justices Brennan and Marshall would have gone further—
declaring the death penalty unconstitutional per se because of its unaccepta-
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bility to contemporary society, unreliability, arbitrariness, and lack of legit-
imate penological purpose.165 
The backlash was swift. “Amid burgeoning political campaigns orga-
nized under the rubric of ‘states’ rights,’ the slogan formerly deployed to 
justify both slavery and Jim Crow segregation,” thirty-six states redrafted 
their death penalty statutes to address the concerns outlined in Furman.166 
Four years later, in Gregg, the Court for the first time addressed—and con-
firmed—the constitutionality of the death penalty per se under the Eighth 
Amendment, but it was far from a full-throated endorsement.167 The Court 
held that, “in the absence of more convincing evidence,” the death penalty 
was not “without justification,” and states were not “clearly wrong” that the 
death penalty “may be necessary.”168 The Court did not say that the death 
penalty could never be held unconstitutional, and three of its authors, Jus-
tices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens, would come to regret their votes—the 
latter two writing opinions toward the end of their careers that called on the 
Court to declare the death penalty unconstitutional.169 
Instead of “overrul[ing] Furman and return[ing] the death penalty to 
the states,” Gregg set in motion a process of constitutional regulation that 
still endures—one designed to tame the death penalty’s “arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, and excessive applications through a growing set of constitutional 
doctrines.”170 In addition to imposing a number of procedural constraints on 
the administration of the death penalty,171 these doctrines would eventually 
lead the Court to categorically prohibit the death penalty for people de-
clared insane (Ford v. Wainright, 1986), people with intellectual disabilities 
(Atkins v. Virginia, 2002), people who were juveniles at the time of the of-
fense (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), and people convicted of non-homicide 
crimes (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008).172 Writing for the majority in Ford, 
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Justice Marshall explicitly recognized the right to life of the condemned, 
concluding that the execution of people declared insane does not “com-
port[]with the fundamental human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment 
protects,” in part, because the prisoner “has no comprehension of why he 
has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”173 
Contrary to Gregg’s assertion that the death penalty does not “invaria-
bly” violate the federal Constitution, a number of state supreme court jus-
tices throughout the country—in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming—would soon reach the opposite conclusion under state con-
stitutions.174 In California and Massachusetts, in particular, this conclusion 
commanded the support of a majority.175 Notably, in holding the death pen-
alty unconstitutional, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied, in 
part, on the death penalty’s deprivation of the “fundamental right [to life] 
‘explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution’” and “the natural 
right of every man.”176 Although voters in California and Massachusetts 
subsequently abrogated their high courts’ decisions by amending their re-
spective state constitutions to permit the death penalty, calls for judicial 
abolition did not fade.177 Decades later, in 2015, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court answered those calls, abolishing its nearly 400-year-old death penalty 
in State v. Santiago. That decision still stands.178 
c. Late 1970s–1990s: Death-Penalty Lite 
In the 1970s and 1980s, high rates of violent crime led many elected 
officials to call for stiffer criminal sentences, including the death penalty.179 
Although crime rates began to decline in the 1990s, the climate of fear 
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stoked by “tough-on-crime” advocates did not diminish.180 As Franklin 
Zimring has written, the 1990s, therefore, “should have been the decade 
when the death penalty was restored as a normal part of the criminal pro-
cess.”181 But they were not. True, the number of executions soared in the 
two decades following Gregg, eventually peaking at ninety-eight in 1999—
the highest number of executions on record since the early 1950s.182 Im-
portantly, however, this number was still well short of the 200 annual exe-
cutions in the late-1930s.183 The death penalty had returned, all right, but it 
was a much leaner version of its former self. In addition, regionalization 
remained a troubling fixture of execution. While three-quarters of the coun-
try—thirty-six states—had reaffirmed their commitment to the death penal-
ty by enacting new death penalty statutes in the wake of Gregg, “[s]outhern 
states continued to account for three-quarters of all executions.”184 
Lastly, despite the expansion of the federal death penalty and polling 
data revealing increased popular support for the death penalty during this 
period, powerful religious and secular institutions rose in opposition.185 In 
his 1995 encyclical, Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life), Pope John Paul 
II added the Roman Catholic Church to the long list of religious organiza-
tions opposed to the death penalty, invoking “the inviolability of human 
life” and “the dignity of the human person.”186 And in 1997, the American 
Bar Association’s House of Delegates called for a nationwide moratorium 
on executions until courts could ensure fairness in the death penalty’s ad-
ministration and minimize the risk of executing innocent people.187 
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d. The Twenty-First Century 
At the start of the twenty-first century, the abolition movement has 
recorded some of its greatest gains in over forty years. By virtually every 
measure, the death penalty has lost the acceptance it once enjoyed.188 
Consider first the new wave of states to abolish the death penalty. Be-
tween 2007 and 2018, nine states abandoned the death penalty through leg-
islative repeal, judicial abolition, or some combination of both; only one 
state—Nebraska—brought its death penalty back.189 Today, thirty states 
retain the death penalty, but few states use it with any frequency.190 Indeed, 
eleven retentionist states plus the federal government and military have not 
carried out an execution in at least a decade.191 Before abolishing the death 
penalty, the governors of Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland granted broad 
commutations that cleared their states’ death rows, and the governors of Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have imposed moratoria on exe-
cutions.192 As the Supreme Court stated in Lawrence in the context of same-
sex sodomy laws, such a “pattern” or “history of nonenforcement suggests 
the moribund character” of laws that no longer enjoy support.193 
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Next, consider executions. Although nineteen retentionist states have 
imposed the death penalty since 2009, the number of executions nationwide 
has steadily declined: from a height of nearly one hundred executions in 
1999, to 66 in 2001, 37 in 2008, and 20 in 2016—the lowest number since 
1991.194 In 2017, there were twenty-three executions, and in 2018, there 
were twenty-five executions—the second and third lowest numbers, respec-
tively, since 1991.195 The geographic concentration of these executions, 
moreover, is breathtaking. Between 2009 and 2018, over three-quarters of 
executions occurred in just six states: Texas (135), Florida (31), Georgia 
(29), Alabama (25), Missouri (22), and Oklahoma (24), with over one-third 
of executions (38%) in Texas alone.196 
Death sentences have also dropped dramatically, from modern era 
highs of more than three hundred annually in the mid-1990s to modern era 
lows of eighty-five or fewer since 2011, culminating in an over forty-year 
low of just thirty-one death sentences in 2016.197 The year 2017, with thirty-
nine death sentences, and 2018, with forty-two death sentences, were the 
second and third lowest, respectively.198 Well over half of all death sentenc-
es in 2018 (57%) “came from just four states: Texas and Florida (both with 
seven) and California and Ohio (both with five).” 199 
Given these paltry numbers, it is not surprising that popular support for 
the death penalty has fallen to its lowest point in decades. Some polling data 
concludes that less than half of all Americans (49%) prefer the death penal-
ty over life without the possibility of parole, while other data suggests that a 
slim majority of the public (55%) prefers the death penalty—the lowest 
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percentage in over forty years.200 This virtual dead heat is significant be-
cause, throughout the world, no country has ever abolished its death penalty 
“as a result of the majority of the general public demanding it.”201 As Frank-
lin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have written, “[m]ajorities of two-thirds 
opposed to abolition were associated with abolition in Great Britain in the 
1960s, Canada in the 1970s, and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
late 1940s.”202 When looked at in this historical context, today’s wavering 
support for the death penalty is a sign of just how tenuous the death penal-
ty’s hold on the public imagination has become. 
Significantly, many evangelical Christians and political conservatives 
now count themselves among those opposed to the death penalty.203 In 
2015, after forty years of supporting the death penalty, the National Asso-
ciation of Evangelicals acknowledged, for the first time, the “biblical and 
theological case” against the death penalty, based on “the sacredness of all 
life, including the lives of those who perpetrate serious crimes and yet have 
the potential for repentance and reformation.”204 The National Latino Evan-
gelical Coalition went further, adopting a position opposing the death penal-
ty.205 Although the Republican Party remains the only major political party 
to support the death penalty, a significant number of Republican state law-
makers have likewise championed legislation repealing the death penalty, 
invoking the death penalty’s incompatibility with conservative principles of 
limited government, fiscal responsibility, and promoting a culture of life.206 
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Among those elected officials who continue to advocate for the death 
penalty, there are doubtless some who believe that the death penalty can 
actually accomplish what it purports to do, that is, consistently execute 
guilty individuals fairly and efficiently.207 But for many others, the death 
penalty now serves primarily a ritualistic function—a “symbolic affirmation 
of the public’s fear of criminal victimization” and “frustration over the ap-
parent failure of government” to do anything about it.208 In the words of 
philosopher Hugo Adam Bedau: 
In today’s electoral politics, a candidate’s support for the death 
penalty amounts to saying: “Believe me, I care about you and I 
hear your anger and frustration. That’s why I support the death 
penalty, whether or not it would do any good in removing the ob-
jective causes of your distress. Knowing where I stand ought to 
make you feel better—and more willing to put government into 
my hands than in the hands of liberals who disagree with us over 
the death penalty. They care more about the vicious criminals 
than they do about the victims and law-abiding citizens like you 
and me.”209 
Bedau’s words, written twenty years before Donald Trump’s ascendancy to 
the presidency, read as if they were lifted from the pages of President 
Trump’s ads, speeches, and tweets calling for the execution of rapists 
(“crazed misfits”), military deserters (“traitors”), and drug dealers (“big 
pushers”), among others.210 Although powerful voices have, for centuries, 
expressed support for the death penalty in the name of retribution and deter-
rence, in recent years, base politics—not high-minded principles—have 
become ever more important to the death penalty’s defense.211 
From this brisk historical survey, a central theme emerges: after four 
centuries of experience with the death penalty, the U.S. tradition of punish-
ing those convicted of murder with death has gradually deteriorated, reveal-
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ing an “emerging awareness” that the right to life ought never be taken 
away through application of the death penalty.212 Justice is better served 
through incarceration.213 This diminishing appetite for the death penalty in 
all but a few states strongly suggests a tradition of punishment that no long-
er commands the respect of the Nation, but there is more. Robust support 
for the death penalty, as gauged by those who regularly execute, is concen-
trated among states with a history of slavery, racial segregation, and race-
conscious criminal justice systems.214 As Carol and Jordan Steiker have ob-
served, “the current map of active death penalty states is predominantly a 
map of the former Confederacy.”215 A tradition infected with racial dispari-
ties, which is observed by only a small fraction of states with a deeply trou-
bling legacy of racial prejudice, is hardly a tradition at all—much less one 
deserving of preservation.  
e. The International Community 
This Nation’s gradual recognition of the fundamental right to life of 
condemned prisoners is bolstered by an overwhelming rejection of the death 
penalty worldwide on right-to-life grounds.216 As the Court stated in Roper 
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v. Simmons, a case that categorically barred the juvenile death penalty 
based, in part, on its rejection by the world community, “express affirmation 
of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples . . . underscores 
the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”217 
This is especially true where, as here, the Court’s “precedent has been . . . 
weakened.”218 Since Gregg, successive Supreme Court decisions have dra-
matically narrowed the death penalty’s reach.219 In light of this “serious ero-
sion” in precedent, worldwide criticism of the death penalty as a violation 
of the right to life is especially relevant.220 
As of December 2018, 106 countries—over half of the world—have 
abolished the death penalty for all crimes.221 Add to this the 8 countries that 
have abolished the death penalty for all “ordinary crimes” and the 28 coun-
tries that have not executed anyone over the past decade, and the total num-
ber of abolitionist countries is 142, or nearly three-quarters of the world.222 
Just 56 countries retain the death penalty, and only 7 countries other than 
the U.S. presently use it with any frequency—China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Ara-
bia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Somalia—“paradoxically the regions of the world 
with justice systems and economies most unlike those of the United 
States.”223 Importantly, the world community’s opinion of the death penalty 
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has not always trended toward abolition. For centuries, world history and 
tradition pointed in the opposite direction, with “the threat of punishment by 
death . . . widely accepted as an effective penal weapon of social con-
trol.”224 In early nineteenth century England, for example, 223 crimes were 
punishable by death.225 
But “[t]ime works changes.”226 A crucial step on the path toward 
worldwide abolition took place nearly seventy years ago with the adoption 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which expressly rec-
ognized “the right to life.”227 Significantly, the Declaration did not express-
ly forbid—indeed, it did not even mention—the death penalty.228 At that 
time, the right to life enshrined in the Declaration was generally understood 
to permit the death penalty, and the vast majority of nations that adopted the 
Declaration employed the death penalty and continued to do so after adop-
tion.229 Two subsequent international treaties carried this understanding 
forward, explicitly exempting the death penalty from the protection of the 
right to life.230 
Notwithstanding international law’s approval of the death penalty for 
certain crimes by the middle of the twentieth century, every Western Euro-
pean nation with the death penalty either suspended or abolished it over the 
next thirty years.231 Notably, each country did so on its own initiative; there 
was no “serious effort to confront the death penalty in Western democracies 
as a human rights issue.”232 
This new insight eventually came in 1983, when the Council of Europe 
formally abolished the death penalty in times of peace through Protocol No. 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, thus providing the “key 
transition from a right to life that exempts state death penalties to a right to 
life that condemns state execution.”233 No longer was the death penalty an 
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issue of state sovereignty to be “decided solely or mainly as an aspect of 
national criminal justice policy”; now it was “a fundamental violation of 
human rights,” namely, the right to be free of excessive, repressive, and tor-
tuous punishments and, critically, the right to life.234 In 2003, the Council of 
Europe went further, abolishing the death penalty “in all circumstances” on 
grounds that “the right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and 
. . . the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of this 
right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human be-
ings.”235 International and regional organizations, including the United Na-
tions and the Organization of American States, have similarly rejected the 
death penalty on right to life grounds. 236 
As a precondition for joining the Council of Europe and the European 
Union, abolition is now almost universally accepted in the countries of West-
ern and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.237 Australasia and Cen-
tral and South America have likewise nearly eradicated the death penalty.238 
In Asia and Africa, the trend toward abolition continues, with a growing 
number of countries abolishing the death penalty outright and in practice, 
generally conducting fewer executions, and calling for abolition out of re-
spect for the “right to life” in regional human rights instruments.239 
The world community has come to understand the death penalty not as 
an issue of state sovereignty, but rather as a violation of the fundamental 
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that “[e]veryone has the right to life” and that “[n]o one shall be condemned to the death penalty, 
or executed”). 
 236 See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ¶ 5, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/2ndOPCCPR.aspx (declaring that “all mea-
sures of abolition of the death penalty should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right 
to life”); IACHR Urges OAS Member States to Abolish the Death Penalty, ORGANIZATION OF AMER-
ICAN STATES (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/115.asp 
(stating that death penalty “is incompatible with the rights to life, humane treatment and due pro-
cess”). 
 Significantly, the International Criminal Court, which was established in 1998 by the Rome 
Statute, does not provide the death penalty for any offense, including genocide and war crimes. 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, arts. 5, 77 (July 17, 1998), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf (listing as penalties imprisonment for a 
term of years, life imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture). 
 237 See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
 238 See id. at 49. 
 239 See id. at 28–29, 75 (discussing the Asian Human Rights Charter and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights). 
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right to life.240 There is nothing to suggest that, in this country, the govern-
mental interest in depriving life “is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”241 
4. Dignity 
In assessing whether the death penalty deprives condemned prisoners 
of the fundamental right to life in violation of substantive due process, 
Obergefell teaches that “history and tradition guide and discipline the in-
quiry but do not set its outer boundaries”; human dignity is also central to 
the analysis.242  
Like laws depriving gays and lesbians of their dignity, the death penal-
ty violates the dignity of condemned prisoners. Indeed, it deprives them of 
not only liberty and equality rights but also “the right of life itself”—one 
which entitles every human being to “respect and fair treatment that befits 
the dignity of man, a dignity that is recognized and guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.”243 In the words of Justice Brennan, the death penalty is the ulti-
mate humiliation, treating people not as “human being[s] possessed of 
common human dignity,” but rather “as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed 
with and discarded.”244 Many sources inform this dignity interest. This Sub-
section briefly touches on four: international human rights and foreign law, 
moral philosophy, religious teaching, and federal and state judicial prece-
dent. 
a. The Dignity of the Condemned in International and Foreign Law 
International human rights law and foreign law underscore the death 
penalty’s deprivation of dignity. As numerous commentators have observed, 
human rights—including the right to life—“are based upon or derivative 
from human dignity. It is because humans have dignity that they have hu-
man rights.”245 International human rights law’s founding charter, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaims the “inherent dignity . . . of 
                                                                                                                           
 240 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 6, at 22. 
 241 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 242 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572, which, in turn, quoted 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857, recognizing fundamental right to 
life). See generally Zagorski Amic. Br., supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 243 Screws, 325 U.S. at 134–35 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 244 Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 245 Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: 
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 79, at 10; see also Hugo Adam Bedau, The 
Eighth Amendment, Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN 
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 79, at 154 (“[H]uman dignity provides the basis for 
equal human rights. All and only creatures with rights . . . have dignity.”). 
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all members of the human family” and the universal “right to life” that 
flows from it.246 Successive international and regional human rights instru-
ments and foreign laws have carried this understanding forward, restricting 
or prohibiting the death penalty on dignity grounds.247 As the leaders of 
several national and international parliaments declared at the first World 
Congress against the death penalty in 2001, “the death penalty is a violation 
of the most fundamental of human rights—the right to life,” and of “human 
dignity” more broadly.248 Notably, in a series of decisions narrowing the 
death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has expressly acknowl-
edged the world community’s linkage of the death penalty and the dignity 
of the condemned.249 
b. Moral Philosophy and the Dignity of the Condemned 
Various strands of moral philosophy likewise support condemned pris-
oners’ right to life on dignity grounds. One view holds that dignity is innate 
and universal among human beings; we all have it and we cannot lose it.250 
According to this view, the condemned have dignity by dint of being hu-
                                                                                                                           
 246 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 227; see also Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Consti-
tutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, 
supra note 79, at 211 (“The authors of [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and successive 
international human rights instruments], seeking a theoretical foundation for the international 
human rights movement that would be acceptable to all peoples, cultures, and political ideologies, 
justified human rights by relating them to human dignity.”); Christopher McCrudden, Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 678 (2008) (stating 
that dignity “supplied a theoretical basis for the human rights movement in the absence of any 
other basis for consensus”). 
 247 McCrudden, supra note 246, at 664, 668 (discussing incorporation of dignity in the na-
tional constitutions of Japan, Italy, Germany, and various other countries after Second World War, 
and “the relatively dramatic increase in the use of dignity in the international human rights law 
context during the 1940s”); see also Uitz, supra note 221 (discussing Art. 54(1) of Hungary Con-
stitution). 
 248 ZIMRING, supra note 7, at 27. 
 249 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78 (relying on international human rights law and for-
eign law to hold that the juvenile death penalty violates “human dignity”); id. at 605 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (concluding that the evolving understanding of whether juvenile death penalty vio-
lates “human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the 
values prevailing in other countries [as] . . . expressed in international law or in the domestic laws 
of individual countries”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing “the 
approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization and 
humanity by shunning capital punishment”). 
 250 See Gewirth, supra note 245, at 12 (“[D]ignity signifies a kind of intrinsic worth that be-
longs equally to all human beings as such, constituted by certain intrinsically valuable aspects of 
being human. This is a necessary, not a contingent, feature of all humans; it is permanent and 
unchanging, not transitory or changeable . . . .”); Henry, supra note 78, at 199–203 (discussing 
“universal human dignity”). 
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man.251 Although they may not be “good” people, the argument goes, they 
are still people. Depriving condemned prisoners of life therefore impli-
cates—indeed, it eviscerates—this innate dignity. 
A more moderate view is that dignity is not innate but must be earned; 
we become worthy of dignity by acting virtuously.252 Obviously, the murder 
of another does not make one worthy of dignity; according to some philos-
ophers, it makes one worthy of death because it represents a failure to act 
morally.253 But, one might argue, a condemned person remains capable of 
acting morally. Consider, for example, Kelly Gissendaner, who recruited a 
man with whom she was romantically involved to murder her husband and 
who subsequently sought forgiveness for her crime, studied theology in 
prison, and ministered to her sister inmates.254 Depriving condemned pris-
oners of life implicates dignity because it forecloses the possibility of their 
becoming worthy of dignity once more. 
A third view focuses not on the dignity of the individual, but on the dig-
nity of the community in relation to the individual.255 Regardless of whether 
the death penalty implicates the dignity of the condemned, the argument 
goes, it most certainly implicates the dignity of those who condemn. Ac-
cording to this view, the death penalty undermines the dignity of the com-
                                                                                                                           
 251 See Gewirth, supra note 245, at 12. 
 252 See id. (discussing dignity as “a kind of gravity or decorum or composure or self-respect 
or self-confidence . . . . Such dignity is a contingent feature of some human beings as against oth-
ers; it may be occurrently had, gained, or lost . . . .”); see also Henry, supra note 78, at 213 (dis-
cussing Roman philosopher Cicero’s use of dignity “to describe the quality of achieving human 
excellence”). 
 253 Ernest Van Den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMER-
ICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 128, at 452 (defending the death penalty as necessary 
“to redeem, or restore, the human dignity of the executed”). A related view, which derives from 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, is that the death penalty respects the dignity of the condemned. This 
tortured logic is oft-criticized. See, e.g., H.A. Bedau, A Reply to van den Haag, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 128, at 468–69 (“[I] think the 
whole idea [that the death penalty affirms the humanity of both victim and murderer] is bizarre. 
The very thought that I affirm the humanity of a murderer by treating him more or less as he treat-
ed his innocent and undeserving victim would be funny were it not so momentous.”). 
 254 See Dan Shepherd et al., Georgia Woman Kelly Gissendaner Sings ‘Amazing Grace’ Dur-
ing Execution, NBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/
pope-urges-halt-execution-georgia-woman-kelly-gissendaner-n435566 [https://perma.cc/YA7L-
7KM8]. 
 255 See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deon-
tology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 773 (2005) (“The imposition of extreme 
punishments such as execution . . . , even in cases involving the most deserving of murderers . . . , 
violates human dignity—not because of what it does to the punished, but rather because of what it 
does to all of us . . . . in whose name the punishment is publicly inflicted.”). 
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munity by coarsening society to the humanity of others—eroding our col-
lective virtue and, in the words of Justice Blackmun, “lessen[ing] us all.”256 
c. Religion and the Dignity of the Condemned 
Religion provides another source of authority for the death penalty’s 
violation of the dignity of the condemned. The Bible teaches that every in-
dividual is created in the image of God, the imago Dei, and must be treated 
accordingly—that is, with dignity.257 “Being in the image of God, the hu-
man individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, 
but someone.” 258 Some strands of religious thought find no inconsistency 
between the death penalty and the dignity of the condemned, often citing 
God’s command to Noah in Genesis: “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by 
man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man.”259 Be-
cause human beings are made in God’s image, the argument goes, their 
murder requires the ultimate sacrifice.260 
Many other strands of religious thought—most notably, Catholic social 
teaching—have reached the opposite conclusion.261 In 1948, Catholic social 
teaching influenced the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1159 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for writ of certiorari); see also Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1294 (Liacos, J., concurring) 
(“What dignity can remain for the government that countenances its use?”); Henry, supra note 78, 
at 221 (“When society treats people in ways that are in-humane, or when people engage in activi-
ties that are de-humanizing, collective virtue as dignity diminishes.”). 
 257 H. Wayne House, The New Testament and Moral Arguments for Capital Punishment, in 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 128, at 423; see also 
Genesis 1:26–:27 (King James) (“And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness 
. . . .”). See generally DAVID GUSHEE, THE SACREDNESS OF HUMAN LIFE (2013). 
 258 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF 
THE CHURCH ¶ 108 (rept. 2005) (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/
justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html [https://perma.
cc/MYK6-FSJT]; accord Henry, supra note 78, at 200–01; see also Gordon Butler, The Essence 
of Human Rights: A Religious Critique, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2009) (“[T]he source of 
inherent human dignity is the fact that ‘every human being is a beloved child of God and a sis-
ter/brother to every other human being.’” (quoting MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 24 (2007))). 
 259 John Howard Yoder, Noah’s Covenant, the New Testament, and Christian Social Order, in 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 128, at 429 (quoting 
Genesis 9:6). 
 260 See House, supra note 257, at 423 (“[T]o punish criminals because they deserve it is to 
respect them as morally responsible persons created in God’s image who knew better and there-
fore have earned this punishment . . . . Capital punishment, then, is the ultimate compliment to the 
human dignity of both victim and murderer . . . .”); David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 
109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 17, 19 (2004) (“Humans are made in God’s image, and the murder of a 
human therefore requires the supreme penalty.”). 
 261 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (discussing Catholic social teaching). 
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Rights, which proclaimed the “dignity and worth of the human person” and 
the concomitant fundamental “right to life.”262 Seventy years later, Catholic 
social teaching condemns the death penalty as a violation of “the dignity of 
the person.”263 Building on the teachings of Popes John Paul II and Bene-
dict, who rejected the death penalty on dignity grounds in all but the rarest 
circumstances, Pope Francis, in 2018, called for the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances “because it attacks the dignity of the person, a 
dignity that is not lost even after having committed the most serious 
crimes.”264 Similarly, although Jewish Biblical tradition requires the death 
penalty in certain rare circumstances, most if not all major schools of mod-
ern Jewish thought have avoided or rejected the death penalty as a violation 
of human dignity.265 
d. The Courts and the Dignity of the Condemned 
Most importantly, the courts have acknowledged the death penalty’s 
violation of the dignity of the condemned.266 For over forty years, the Su-
preme Court has made dignity the touchstone for gauging who may receive 
the death penalty,267 the procedures under which the death penalty may be 
imposed,268 and the means by which the death penalty may be carried out 
                                                                                                                           
 262 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 227; see also McCrudden, supra note 246, at 677–78 
(discussing Catholic social teaching’s influence on the inclusion of dignity in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights). 
 263 The Sovereign Pontiff Francis, Letter to the Bishops Regarding the New Revision of Num-
ber 2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church on the Death Penalty ¶ 6 (June 28, 2018), 
http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2018/08/02/0556/01210.html#lett
eraing [https://perma.cc/PK3A-D8HA]. 
 264 Id. ¶¶ 1–7. 
 265 Butler, supra note 258, at 1272 (citation omitted); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Unit-
ed States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Other Religious Organizations in Support of Re-
spondent at 8, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (“[T]he American Jewish 
Committee opposes capital punishment in general, as cruel, unjust and incompatible with the dig-
nity and self-respect of man . . . .”); Marvin Lim, Human Dignity and Punishment in Judaic and 
Islamic Law: War and the Death Penalty, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 303, 307–18 (2016) (arguing that 
“[a]ll major schools of modern Jewish thought appear to clearly reject the death penalty as a 
means of punishment. . . . primarily because even the worst wrongdoers retain their dignity”). 
 266 See infra notes 267–281 and accompanying text. 
 267 See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420, 446–47 (execution of people who commit non-
homicide crimes violates “respect for the dignity of the person”); accord Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 
578–79 (juveniles); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311, 321 (people with intellectual disabilities); Ford, 477 
U.S. at 406, 409–10 (people declared insane); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (death penalty “must accord 
with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment’” (quot-
ing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))). 
 268 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 255, 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that discretion-
ary death penalty statutes are invalid because they are “pregnant with discrimination”—“feeding 
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a 
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under the Eighth Amendment.269 In Hall v. Florida, for example, the Court 
struck down a Florida law that narrowed the class of people exempted from 
execution based on intellectual disability.270 “Florida’s law,” the Court con-
cluded, “contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to 
teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States are labor-
atories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic 
dignity the Constitution protects.”271 
Several current and former Supreme Court Justices have gone further, 
concluding that the death penalty per se is incompatible with human dignity 
under the Eighth Amendment.272 In Furman, Justice Brennan argued that 
the death penalty was inconsistent with the “fundamental premise . . . that 
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common hu-
man dignity.”273 Justice Marshall agreed. “In recognizing the humanity of 
our fellow beings,” he wrote, “we pay ourselves the highest tribute.”274 
Decades after voting to revive the death penalty in Gregg, Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens similarly turned against it. In his dissenting opinion 
in Callins v. Collins, Justice Blackmun famously vowed to “never again 
tinker with the machinery of death,” and recalled, in vivid prose, the con-
summation of such tinkering: Mr. Callins, his arms affixed with “intrave-
nous tubes carry[ing] the instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifi-
cally for the purpose of killing human beings”—“no longer a defendant, an 
appellant, or a petitioner, but a man, strapped to a gurney, and seconds away 
from extinction.”275 In his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, Justice Ste-
vens, reflecting on his over thirty years on the bench, pronounced the death 
penalty a “pointless and needless extinction of life.”276 And in his dissenting 
opinion in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, ar-
gued that it is “highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”277 In support of this argument, Justice Breyer relied on the 
Court’s decisions in Atkins, Roper, Louisiana, and Hall—all four of which 
                                                                                                                           
member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a 
more protected position”). 
 269 See, e.g., Baze, 553 U.S. at 49 (prohibiting “inhuman and barbarous” methods of execu-
tion). 
 270 See Hall, 572 U.S. at 724. 
 271 Id. 
 272 See infra notes 273–278 and accompanying text. 
 273 Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 274 Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 275 510 U.S. at 1143 (emphasis added). 
 276 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86. 
 277 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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invoked dignity to categorically prohibit the death penalty for certain types 
of crimes and offenders.278 
Over the course of the past half-century, three state supreme courts and 
at least eleven state high court justices throughout the nation have similarly 
concluded that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional on dignity 
grounds.279 As memorably stated by Connecticut Supreme Court Justice 
Lubbie Harper, Jr., an African-American jurist, native son of inner-city New 
Haven, and the descendant of slaves from North Carolina: 
[T]he categorical exclusion of any person from humanity cannot 
be reconciled with a legitimate vision of human dignity . . . . It is 
a reality, albeit a difficult one, that even a person who commits 
the most heinous and unforgivable acts is still one of us—a mem-
ber of the human community and of our society . . . . No matter 
how fervently some may wish it otherwise, all individuals are en-
titled, as citizens of this state and, more fundamentally, as human 
beings, to be treated with the dignity and respect that is the hall-
mark of our society.280 
Although these federal and state court opinions addressed the dignity 
of condemned prisoners under the Eighth Amendment or state corollary, 
their discussion of dignity applies with equal force to substantive due pro-
cess, which shares a commitment to dignity.281 
B. The Death Penalty Is Not Narrowly Tailored to  
Serve a Compelling State Interest 
Having determined that specificity, history and tradition, dignity, and 
the positive/negative rights distinction support the condemned’s fundamen-
tal right to life, this Article now turns to the second step of the substantive 
due process inquiry: whether the death penalty is narrowly tailored to serve 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See id. at 2760, 2772 (citation omitted). 
 279 See, e.g., Santiago, 122 A.3d at 32 (stating that death penalty was at odds with “dignity 
reflect[ing] . . . the [n]ation we aspire to be” (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992)); see also Barry, 
The Law of Abolition, supra note 162, at 537–50 (discussing state supreme court decisions holding 
that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional). 
 280 Santiago, 49 A.3d at 697, 705 (Harper, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 281 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing similarities in 
the analysis of whether the death penalty is “cruel and unusual” under Eighth Amendment, on the 
one hand, and whether the death penalty deprives fundamental right to life in violation of substan-
tive due process, on the other); Yoshino, Freedom, supra note 49, at 791–92 (noting the connec-
tion between dignity in the Fourteenth Amendment LGBT rights context and the Eighth Amend-
ment death penalty context); accord Barry, Dignity Clauses, supra note 33, at 387. 
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a compelling state interest, namely, retribution or deterrence.282 The burden 
is on the State to show that it does so.283 
In Gregg, the Supreme Court concluded that the Georgia legislature 
was not “clearly wrong” in its determination that the death penalty serves 
the purposes of deterrence and retribution.284 Because Gregg was an Eighth 
Amendment decision, not a substantive due process decision, the Court did 
not determine whether these interests were compelling, and, if so, whether 
the death penalty was narrowly tailored to serve these interests.285 
The answer to the first question is straightforward: deterrence and ret-
ribution are compelling state interests.286 Were this not the case, incarcera-
tion, itself, would violate substantive due process by depriving the funda-
mental right to liberty. It does not. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] 
State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison convicted crimi-
nals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution.”287 The answer to the 
second question—whether the death penalty is narrowly tailored to serve 
the compelling purposes of retribution and deterrence—is considerably 
more nuanced. 
1. Compelling Interests Not Served 
To the extent that the death penalty ever served the compelling inter-
ests of retribution and deterrence, it no longer does so; arbitrariness, delay, 
and unreliability deprive the death penalty of any such interest.288 
a. Arbitrariness 
The death penalty does not serve a compelling interest because the in-
dividualized process of selecting people for death is hopelessly arbitrary.289 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See infra notes 283–313 and accompanying text. 
 283 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 831. 
 284 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 186. 
 285 See id. at 168 (holding that death penalty did not invariably violate Eighth Amendment as 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 286 See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course 
imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution.”); Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (discussing “society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and 
punishing those who violate the law”). But see, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., con-
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taliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a 
government in a free society.” (citation omitted)). 
 287 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. 
 288 See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2756–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Santiago, 122 A.3d at 57–
73. 
 289 See infra notes 290–294 and accompanying text. 
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Being executed is about as random as being struck by lightning.290 Former 
Supreme Court Justices and state high courts have gone further, suggesting 
an arbitrariness that is not random: the disproportionate selection of people 
for death based on race.291 A punishment that is inherently arbitrary—or 
worse, discriminatory—does not deter offenders.292 Retribution is also not 
served by the death penalty, which gives “just deserts” to only some offend-
ers, provides closure to only some family members, and expresses society’s 
outrage for only some murders.293 Such results do not restore balance to the 
moral order; they perpetuate imbalance. 294 
b. Delay 
A second reason that the death penalty does not serve a compelling 
state interest is the prolonged and inevitable delay between sentencing and 
execution.295 Such delay deprives the death penalty of any deterrent ef-
fect.296 Would-be offenders face not a swift and certain execution, but in-
                                                                                                                           
 290 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 291 See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “risk that 
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impermissible and unconstitutional.”). 
 294 See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 66 (“To the extent that the ultimate punishment is imposed on 
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but, rather, tarnishes the moral order.”). 
 295 See infra notes 296–302 and accompanying text. 
 296 See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the rarity and 
delay of executions “must have some offsetting effect on a potential perpetrator’s fear of a death 
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stead what one federal district judge has called “life imprisonment with the 
remote possibility of death.”297 This is hardly a deterrent. Retribution is also 
not served. 298 Decades after the crime, community outrage has subsided as 
the community has changed.299 Family members seeking closure have in-
stead been retraumatized during protracted legal proceedings that force 
them to relive their loved one’s murder.300 And the offender who once “de-
served” death “may have found [herself] a changed human being”—like 
Kelly Gissendaner, a once-vengeful spouse who died a woman of faith 
seeking and preaching forgiveness.301 
Several state high courts and former Supreme Court Justices have gone 
further, arguing that prolonged death row delay is literally “too much” retri-
bution because of the “brutalizing psychological effects of impending exe-
cution,” namely, prolonged solitary confinement and the “uncertainty as to 
whether a death sentence will in fact be carried out.”302 
c. Unreliability 
A third reason that the death penalty does not serve a compelling inter-
est is its inherent unreliability.303 Since 1973, 165 people have been exoner-
                                                                                                                           
penalty. And, even if that effect is no more than slight, it makes it difficult to believe . . . that such 
a rare event significantly deters horrendous crimes.”); Santiago, 122 A.3d at 59 (“[T]he fact that 
one who commits the most heinous of crimes can expect to spend decades in prison prior to any 
execution suggests that capital punishment promises little if any deterrence over and above life 
imprisonment.”). 
 297 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones v. 
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 298 See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]elays and low probabil-
ity of execution . . . may well attenuate the community’s interest in retribution to the point where 
it cannot by itself amount to a significant justification for the death penalty.”); see also Santiago, 
122 A.3d at 63–64 (“[L]engthy if not interminable delays in carrying out capital sentences do not 
just undermine the death penalty’s deterrent effect; they also spoil its capacity for satisfying retri-
bution.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 299 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that, by the time the de-
fendant is executed, “the community is a different group of people” and “[f]eelings of outrage may 
have subsided”). 
 300 See Santiago, 122 A.3d at 64 (discussing the “second victimization of survivors,” who 
“must contend with repeated reminders about the murder during the protracted [court] proceed-
ings”— “imped[ing] the healing process”). 
 301 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Connor, supra note 254 (discussing 
Kelly Gissendaner, who sought forgiveness and ministered to her sister inmates). 
 302 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Anderson, 493 P.2d at 895; see also 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1144 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Delays can aggravate 
the cruelty of capital punishment by subjecting the offender to years in solitary confinement 
. . . .”); Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283 (discussing “mental pain . . . during the inevitable long wait 
between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death”) (quoting Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. at 287–88 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 303 See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text. 
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ated from death row, including five people in 2017 and two people in 
2018.304 It does not take a mathematical model (though there are some) to 
conclude from these astonishingly high numbers that “innocent Americans 
have been and will continue to be executed in the post-Furman era.”305 
Killing an innocent person obviously serves no compelling state inter-
est because it is not punishment at all—it is murder, or something “perilous-
ly close” to it.306 A majority of the Supreme Court has therefore concluded 
that “the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a 
constitutionally intolerable event.”307 Some authorities have gone further, 
holding that the substantial risk of executing a legally and factually inno-
cent person is constitutionally intolerable. Among them are multiple former 
Supreme Court Justices, the Connecticut Supreme Court, and U.S. District 
Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, who equated execution under the Federal Death 
Penalty Act to “foreseeable, state-sponsored murder of innocent human be-
ings.”308 
2. Not Narrowly Tailored 
Even if the death penalty—with its intractable flaws—served some 
marginal deterrent or retributive purpose, it is hardly narrowly tailored. Nar-
row tailoring requires the government “to prove that no other alternative, 
less intrusive of the right, can work.”309 Here, the government cannot meet 
its burden.310 It cannot prove that death deters better than incarceration; in-
deed, the Court in Gregg acknowledged that there was no such proof, and 
                                                                                                                           
 304 Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row [https://perma.cc/X5J2-H4GW] 
(last updated Nov. 5, 2018). 
 305 Santiago, 122 A.3d at 65; accord Callins, 510 U.S. at 1159 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2757–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing studies). 
 306 Santiago, 122 A.3d at 65 (citation omitted). 
 307 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring); accord id. at 431–32 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 308 United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see, e.g., Baze, 553 
U.S. at 85–86 (Stevens, J., concurring); Callins, 510 U.S. at 1158 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); San-
tiago, 122 A.3d at 65. 
 309 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 831 (emphasis added). 
 310 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[F]or more than 200 years men 
have labored to demonstrate that capital punishment serves no purpose that life imprisonment 
could not serve equally well. And they have done so with great success.”); cf. Br. of Appellant at 
4–5, 102–03, Hines v. Mays, No. 15-5384 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017) (arguing that, where the State 
originally agreed to a life sentence for the defendant, only to have that agreement rejected by the 
trial judge and later replaced with a sentence of death, the State could not prove that the death 
penalty was the “least restrictive means” of punishing the defendant as required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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studies conducted since that time are, at best, inconclusive.311 Similarly, 
although the death penalty may arguably be a rational way to give the con-
demned what he deserves,312 the government cannot prove that it is the only 
way, as substantive due process requires.313 Arguments to the contrary re-
duce to a tautology: the death penalty provides “just deserts” because the 
condemned deserve death. 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Recognition of the right to life of the condemned under substantive 
due process invites objections from all sides. This Part takes up the most 
obvious arguments and ventures some responses. Section A addresses the 
argument that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments foreclose recognition 
of the condemned’s right to life.314 Section B responds to the argument that 
the Eighth Amendment, not the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, governs 
the constitutionality of the death penalty per se.315 Section C addresses the 
elephant in the room—the argument that recognition of the condemned’s 
right to life will undermine a woman’s right to abortion.316 
A. The Text of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Forecloses 
Recognition of the Condemned’s Right to Life 
The most obvious rejoinder to the argument that the death penalty vio-
lates substantive due process is a textual one: the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments explicitly mention, and therefore categorically authorize, the 
death penalty.317 As Ernest Van Den Haag, a prominent proponent of capital 
punishment, succinctly stated: 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 347 (“No one can ever know how many people have refrained 
from murder because of the fear of being hanged.” (citation omitted)). Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. 
at 185 (“[T]here is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting th[e] view” that 
the death penalty “may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties . . . .”), 
with Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing recent reports finding “pro-
found uncertainty” and “insufficient evidence” regarding the death penalty’s deterrent effect). 
 312 But see Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“There is no rational basis for 
concluding that capital punishment is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.”). See also supra notes 288–308 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why the death 
penalty does not serve compelling interests). 
 313 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (discussing government’s burden). 
 314 See infra notes 317–331 and accompanying text. 
 315 See infra notes 332–346 and accompanying text. 
 316 See infra notes 347–364 and accompanying text. 
 317 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”); id. amends. V, XIV (stating that no person 
shall be “deprived of life . . . without due process of law”); see also Joseph Blocher, The Death 
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The fifth amendment, passed in 1791, states that “no person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” Thus, with “due process of law,” the Constitution authorizes 
depriving persons “of life, liberty, or property.” The fourteenth 
amendment, passed in 1868, applies an identical provision to the 
states. The Constitution, then, authorizes the death penalty.318 
The late Justice Antonin Scalia and several of his brethren, past and present, 
agree. “It is impossible to hold unconstitutional that which the Constitution 
explicitly contemplates,” Justice Scalia wrote in Glossip v. Gross.319 
Even assuming that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments affirmatively 
grant (as opposed to merely restrict) the power to execute—a highly debata-
ble proposition320—it is a limited grant. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, by their terms, permit the death penalty only where “due process” is 
afforded.321 Due process comes in two varieties—procedural and substan-
tive; to pass muster under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the death 
penalty must satisfy both.322 Accordingly, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not permit imposition of the death penalty where procedural safe-
guards are inadequate, or where imposition of the death penalty would vio-
late a fundamental right without adequate justification.323 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
Penalty and the Fifth Amendment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016) (discussing Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment argument in support of death penalty). 
 318 Van Den Haag, supra note 253, at 445. 
 319 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring); see also Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 380 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he explicit language of the Con-
stitution affirmatively acknowledges the legal power to impose capital punishment.”). 
 320 Blocher, supra note 317, at 2–3 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment contains prohibitions, not pow-
ers, and there is no reason to suppose that it somehow nullifies other constitutional prohibitions 
. . . .”); see also Barry, Dignity Clauses, supra note 33, at 432 (“[A]ll three state supreme courts 
that abolished the death penalty have done so notwithstanding reference to capital punishment in 
their state constitutions.”). 
 321 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 322 See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (“Our prior cases have held 
the provision that ‘[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law,’ U.S. Const., amend. 14, § 1, to ‘guarante[e] more than fair process,’ Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719[] (1997), and to cover a substantive sphere as well, ‘barring 
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them 
. . . .’”); id. at 855 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It can no longer be controverted that due process 
has a substantive component as well.”). 
 323 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 435–37 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)) (discussing procedural and substantive due process in 
the death penalty context); see also Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (discussing the Court’s responsibility 
under the Due Process Clause to “exercise . . . judgment upon the whole course of the [criminal] 
proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with 
the most heinous offenses”). 
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death penalty surely would have satisfied substantive due process at the 
time of the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in 1791 and 
1868, respectively, when substantive due process was still in its infancy (or, 
in 1791, non-existent),324 the death penalty no longer does so for the reasons 
discussed in this Article.325 Had the amendments’ drafters intended to make 
the death penalty permissible in perpetuity, they should have been more 
specific.326 Alas, they were not; there is no “governmental right to kill.”327 
A related textual argument is that declaring the death penalty unconsti-
tutional per se under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would render 
the words “without due process of law” superfluous with respect to life, 
yielding a right to life that can never be deprived.328 This is incorrect. A Su-
preme Court decision declaring the death penalty a violation of substantive 
due process would only prohibit the State from taking lives as punishment; 
it would not prohibit the State from taking lives in other contexts, such as 
police interactions, provided that procedural safeguards were afforded and 
the taking of life was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.329 
Forbidding deprivations of life in some contexts but not others is therefore 
no different than forbidding deprivations of liberty in some contexts (e.g., 
the fundamental right to refuse medical care) but not others (e.g., no fun-
damental right to physician-assisted suicide).330 Declaring the death penalty 
a violation of substantive due process, moreover, would not open the door 
to making incarceration a violation of substantive due process. Although 
there may come a day when the deprivation of liberty, itself, is deemed too 
harsh a punishment, history and precedent strongly suggest that this day is a 
long way off.331 
                                                                                                                           
 324 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
Court first applied substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, [60 
U.S. 393 (1857)].”). 
 325 See supra notes 282–313 and accompanying text (discussing the death penalty’s lack of a 
compelling purpose and narrow tailoring); see also supra note 213 (discussing the historical 
emergence of incarceration as a viable alternative to execution). 
 326 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (“Had those who drew and ratified 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the com-
ponents of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not 
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations 
can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”). 
 327 State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811, 829 (Conn. 2016) (Palmer, J., concurring). 
 328 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 329 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (holding that high-speed police chase that resulted in death of 
suspect did not violate substantive due process because there was “no intent to harm suspect[] 
physically or to worsen [his] legal plight”). 
 330 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 885, 888. 
 331 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 118 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“There is 
simply no basis in our society’s history or in the precedents of this Court to support the existence 
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B. The Eighth Amendment, Not the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
Governs the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Per se 
Another counterargument to the substantive due process challenge is 
prudential: given the Court’s “reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of sub-
stantive due process,”332 per se challenges to the death penalty are more 
appropriately analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. This argument de-
rives from the Supreme Court’s “more-specific-provision” rule, which 
states that “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be ana-
lyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the 
rubric of substantive due process.”333 Because the death penalty is a pun-
ishment, the argument goes, the Eighth Amendment covers it, and “the 
more generalized notion of substantive due process” does not apply.334 At-
tractive in its simplicity, this argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, it is not at all clear that the Eighth Amendment “covers” per se 
challenges to the death penalty to the exclusion of substantive due process.335 
As between the Eighth Amendment, on the one hand, and the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, on the other, the latter seem to provide the more “explic-
it textual source of constitutional protection against a particular source of 
government behavior.”336 Indeed, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are 
the only constitutional provisions that explicitly mention the death penal-
ty.337 Prominent jurists like Justice Scalia have repeatedly pointed to the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for the proposition that the death penalty 
is constitutional per se; it would be strange to conclude that those amend-
ments have no application when that very proposition is challenged.338 
To the extent there is any doubt that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments apply to per se challenges to the death penalty, the prisoner—who 
faces a punishment indisputably greater than any other—ought to receive 
the benefit of the constitutional provision most protective of life.339 In the 
                                                                                                                           
of a sweeping, general fundamental right to ‘freedom from bodily restraint’ applicable to all per-
sons in all contexts. If convicted prisoners could claim such a right, for example, we would sub-
ject all prison sentences to strict scrutiny. This we have consistently refused to do.”). 
 332 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842. 
 333 Id. at 843; accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 334 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. 
 335 See id. 
 336 Id. 
 337 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 338 See supra notes 317–331 and accompanying text (arguing that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments contemplate the death penalty). 
 339 See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“The Court, as well as the separate 
opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of 
 
1598 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1545 
context of a per se challenge to the death penalty, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are more protective than the Eighth Amendment because they 
require the State to prove that the death penalty is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling interest—i.e., that retribution and deterrence cannot be 
achieved through any less restrictive means.340 The Eighth Amendment, by 
contrast, turns this analysis on its head: according to Gregg v. Georgia, the 
validity of the death penalty is “presume[d],” and the “heavy burden” is on 
the prisoner to produce “convincing evidence” that the death penalty is “so 
totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous in-
fliction of suffering.”341 It cannot be that the Supreme Court is duty-bound 
to give less protection to life; given the heightened burden imposed on the 
prisoner by the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
should control.342 
Second, even if the “more-specific-provision” rule were applicable to a 
substantive due process challenge to the death penalty, the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the rule is anything but certain.343 Indeed, in the nearly thir-
ty years since announcing its “more-specific-provision” rule, the Supreme 
Court has never applied the rule to a substantive due process challenge in 
the death penalty context—let alone a challenge to the death penalty per 
se.344 In fact, the Court has rarely invoked the rule to reject a substantive 
due process challenge in favor of an Eighth Amendment challenge; the cas-
es applying the rule have almost universally involved unlawful searches and 
                                                                                                                           
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capi-
tal sentencing determination.”); cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 313, 326–27 (1986) (analyz-
ing prison security claims under substantive due process and the Eighth Amendment, and holding 
that, “[i]n the prison security context, the Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater pro-
tection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” (emphasis added)). 
 340 See supra notes 99–102, 309–313 and accompanying text (discussing government’s bur-
den under substantive due process). 
 341 428 U.S. 153, 175, 187 (1976); see also id. at 186–87 (stating that “the infliction of death 
as a punishment for murder is not without justification,” many post-Furman statutes reflected “a 
responsible effort to define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most 
probably an effective deterrent,” and the Georgia legislature’s judgment “that capital punishment 
may be necessary in some cases” was not “clearly wrong” (emphasis added)). 
 342 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Amendment and due 
process protections). 
 343 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49, 52 (1993) (“We have 
rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees 
of another . . . . [A]ssuming that the Fourth Amendment were satisfied in this case, it remains for 
us to determine whether the seizure complied with our well-settled jurisprudence under the Due 
Process Clause.”); Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992) (“Certain wrongs affect more than 
a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands.”). 
 344 See infra notes 345–346 and accompanying text (collecting cases discussing the “more-
specific-provision” rule). 
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seizures implicating the Fourth Amendment.345 Furthermore, the rule’s ap-
plication is highly contested—often commanding a mere plurality or in-
voked by dissenters.346 The Court’s failure to invoke the rule in like con-
texts, together with the disputed nature of the rule itself, thus raises substan-
tial doubts about the Court’s willingness to apply the rule to a challenge to 
the death penalty per se. 
C. Recognition of the Condemned’s Right to Life Will Undermine a 
Woman’s Right to Abortion 
Lastly, pro-choice advocates might argue that a Supreme Court deci-
sion invalidating the death penalty as a violation of the right to life will un-
dermine a woman’s right to abortion. At first blush, the concern seems rea-
sonable. If the State cannot take the lives of prisoners, the argument goes, it 
must also protect the lives of the unborn.347 But this argument is too fac-
ile.348 Although both the death penalty and abortion contexts implicate life 
interests, these interests are legally distinct, making it unlikely that the Su-
preme Court’s recognition of the right to life of the condemned would ex-
tend to the life of a fetus.349 There are two reasons for this. 
                                                                                                                           
 345 Compare Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 305 at 273–74 (1994) (plurality) (applying 
more-specific-provision rule in context of police seizure), and Graham, 490 U.S. at 400 (same), 
with Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841–43 (1998) (finding rule inapplicable to claim 
involving police deprivation of right to life outside of search-and-seizure context). 
 346 See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with majority’s substantive due process analysis of excessive force claim because 
majority did not first “decide whether a pretrial detainee can bring a Fourth Amendment claim”); 
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200–01 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (disagreeing with majority’s substantive due process analysis of the denial of a build-
ing permit because “a more specific constitutional provision”—the Equal Protection Clause—
“govern[ed]”). Compare Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 305 at 273–74 (1994) (plurality) (re-
jecting a substantive due process claim because the Fourth Amendment provided “explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection” for arrests without probable cause) (quoting Graham), with id. 
at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgement) (suggesting that the more-specific-provision rule 
would not apply where substantive due process protections exceeded—as opposed to “mir-
ror[ed]”—those of Fourth Amendment), and id. at 288–89 & n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (concluding that Graham did not foreclose a substantive due process claim). 
 347 See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT BE-
FORE ROE V. WADE 126, 163, 192 (2015) (tracing the history of pro-life activism throughout the 
twentieth century, including its opposition to the death penalty); see also Jones, supra note 203, at 
238 (discussing conservative Catholic support for “two pieces of legislation introduced in Kan-
sas—one to limit abortion and another to repeal the death penalty”). 
 348 Cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Yesterday and Today, 95 DICK. L. 
REV. 759, 770 (1991) (“I do not think that logic requires anyone who is absolutely opposed to the 
death penalty to oppose as well all abortions, suicides, mercy killings, lethal force, and so on.”). 
 349 See infra notes 350–364 and accompanying text. According to Roe v. Wade, these interests 
are also factually distinct because the fetus, unlike the condemned, “represents only the potentiali-
ty of life.” 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 106, at 1229 
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First, the Court is unlikely to reach the question of whether a fetus has 
a right to life because of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ federal and 
state action requirements, which prohibit the government—not private ac-
tors—from depriving rights.350 In the abortion context, the State is not de-
priving life, but is instead protecting fetal life from abortion. The legal ques-
tion in this context, therefore, is not whether a woman can deprive a fetus of 
the right to life, but rather whether the State can deprive a woman of the 
right to abortion.351 In Roe v. Wade and its progeny, the Court answered this 
question in the negative; the government may not prohibit abortion prior to 
viability.352 Although it is possible that a newly constituted Court might 
overturn Roe, it would most likely do so on grounds that women have no 
right to an abortion—not that fetuses have a right to life.353 Simply put, the 
Court is unlikely to determine whether the State can deprive the right to life 
of the fetus because the question would not be before the Court. In the death 
penalty context, by contrast, the deprivation of the right to life of the con-
                                                                                                                           
(“[T]here may be a reasonable chance—but clearly no more than that—that there will be a baby 
but for an abortion.”); Mayo Clinic Staff, Miscarriage, MAYO CLINIC (July 20, 2016), https://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/pregnancy-loss-miscarriage/symptoms-causes/syc-2035
4298 [https://perma.cc/Y7D2-RE9A] (“About 10 to 20 percent of known pregnancies end in mis-
carriage.”); Pregnancy and Infant Loss, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/features/pregnancy-infant-loss-day/index.html [https://perma.cc/PLA8-9EX5] (last 
updated Oct. 15, 2018) (“[E]ach year about 24,000 babies are stillborn in the United States”). 
 Dozens of countries appear to have acknowledged a distinction between fetal life and the life 
of the condemned by abolishing the death penalty while permitting abortion on request. Compare 
Worldwide Abortion Policies, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/
interactives/global-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/F72S-TBY6] (showing that, as of 2013, fifty-seven 
countries, including the U.S., permitted abortion on request), with DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
Countries, supra note 221 (showing that, of the fifty-seven countries that permit abortion on re-
quest, forty-nine have abolished the death penalty explicitly or in practice). Ireland, a predomi-
nantly Catholic country, is a case in point; it abolished the death penalty in 1990 and repealed its 
abortion ban in 2018. See Eighth Amendment Repealed as Irish President Signs Bill Into Law, 
BBC NEWS (Sept. 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45568094. 
 350 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 351 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 603 (“[T]he debate [over abortion rights] is rarely 
couched in terms of the meaning of the word ‘life’ in the due process clause but, instead, is usually 
about whether women have a right to terminate their pregnancies and whether fetuses should be 
considered persons under the Constitution.”). 
 352 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming Roe’s 
“recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain 
it without undue interference from the State”). 
 353 See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on 
demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.”); see also Raymond B. Marcin, 
God’s Littlest Children and the Right to Live: The Case for a Positivist Pro-Life Overturning of 
Roe, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 38, 45–46 (2008) (stating that, if the Court decides to 
overrule Roe, it will most likely do so on grounds that “nothing in the Constitution protects the 
right to privacy in the abortion decision,” rather than because the “prenatal child has a fundamen-
tal and unalienable right to life”). 
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demned is front and center. In this context, unlike in the abortion context, 
the State kills. 
Second, even if the Court were to reach the issue of whether a fetus 
has a fundamental right to life, the Court is unlikely to find that such a right 
exists. This Article has argued that the condemned have a fundamental right 
to life based on a history and tradition of diminished support for the death 
penalty nationally and worldwide, the dignity of the condemned, and the 
negative right not to be killed by one’s government.354 The case for the right 
to life of a fetus, by contrast, is far weaker. Although an extensive discus-
sion of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, some preliminary 
points are in order. 
Unlike the death penalty, history and tradition do not suggest a country 
that has turned its back on abortion. While the number of executions has 
steadily declined to just twenty-five in 2018, the number of abortions in 
recent years, though declining, hovers around one million—its decline 
largely attributable to fewer unwanted pregnancies.355 Worldwide, the num-
ber of countries permitting abortion has increased over the past two dec-
ades: 96% of countries permit abortion to save the life of the mother; two-
thirds of the world permit abortion for this and other specified reasons; and 
30% of all countries, including the United States, permit abortion on request 
up to a certain point in the pregnancy (e.g., twenty weeks).356 Furthermore, 
although there is dignity in fetal life, there is also dignity in a woman’s 
choice not to carry the fetus to term. These dignity interests compete, as the 
Court recognized in Roe’s trimester framework and Casey’s undue burden 
framework.357 The dignity of the fetus, therefore, is not absolute. Indeed, 
according to the Supreme Court in Roe and its progeny, women do not 
                                                                                                                           
 354 See supra notes 106–281 and accompanying text. 
 355 Reid Wilson, Abortion Rates Hit New Low as Birthrates Fall, THE HILL (Dec. 6, 2017) 
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/363557-abortion-rates-hit-new-low-as-birth-rates-fall 
[https://perma.cc/JT7A-8Z99] (discussing declining abortion rates and birthrates across the coun-
try); see also Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Population Group Abortion Rates and Lifetime 
Incidence of Abortion: United States 2008–2014, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1904, 1907 (2017), 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2017.304042 (finding that nearly one in 
four U.S. women (23.7%) will have an abortion by age forty-five). Ancient history and the com-
mon law likewise do not support the fetus’s right to life. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 (stating that 
laws proscribing abortion “are not of ancient or even of common-law origin[; i]nstead, they derive 
from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century”). 
 356 Angelina E. Theodorou & Aleksandra Sandstrom, How Abortion Is Regulated Around the 
World, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/06/how-
abortion-is-regulated-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/822U-DLRJ]. 
 357 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–77 (employing “undue burden standard” to “reconcil[e] the State’s 
interest [in protecting potential life] with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty”); Roe, 
410 U.S. at 162–63 (establishing trimester framework to determine when government’s interest in 
maternal health and “potentiality of human life” overrides the rights of the pregnant woman). 
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merely have a dignity interest in choosing whether to bear a child—they 
have a right.358 In the death penalty context, by contrast, the dignity of the 
condemned is complete. There simply is no competing dignity interest, 
much less a right.359 On the contrary, the State’s interest is one of indigni-
ty—disparaging life because it supposedly deters or is somehow de-
served.360 
Lastly, the fetus’s right to life is not a negative right to be shielded 
from state power. After all, the State does not deprive the lives of fetuses; 
when the State acts in this context, it acts to protect fetuses.361 The fetus’s 
right to life is thus a positive right to be protected by the State from abor-
tion. This is a feeble claim to a fundamental right.362 Automobile accidents, 
drug overdoses, and air pollution take hundreds of thousands of lives each 
year, but this does not mean that we have a positive right to protective laws 
that take cars off the road, drugs off the street, or carbon monoxide out of 
the air. The right to life of the condemned is different, and on surer footing. 
It is a negative right to be free from punitive laws that kill.363 To carry the 
                                                                                                                           
 358 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54. 
 359 Although future murder victims, their family members, and society more generally may 
have an interest in deterrence (i.e., in not being killed by private actors) and retribution (i.e., in 
killing murderers because they deserve it), they do not have a right to it. According to DeShaney 
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, there is no affirmative right to state protec-
tion from murder—much less a right to the punishment of murderers with death. 489 U.S. 189, 
196 (1989). 
 360 See supra notes 242–281 and accompanying text (discussing dignity in the death penalty 
context). 
 361 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (discussing the State’s interest in protecting potential life). 
 362 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195–97 (stating that the purpose of the Due Process Clause 
“was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each 
other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to 
the democratic political processes. . . . As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State’s failure 
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Process Clause.”); Sandage v. Bd. of Com’rs of Vanderburgh Cty., 548 F.3d 595, 596 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by 
criminals or madmen. . . . The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let 
people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so 
elementary a service as maintaining law and order. There is a moral right to such services—
protection against violence is the single most important function of government—and a govern-
ment that fails in this duty invites well-deserved political retribution. But there is no enforceable 
federal constitutional right.”) (citation omitted); see also supra notes 94–98 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Court’s reluctance to recognize positive rights under substantive due process). 
 In moral and political philosophy, by contrast, negative liberties are not constrained by state 
action; they can encompass the freedom from intrusion by government as well as private individu-
als. See Positive and Negative Liberty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ (“[N]egative liberty is the absence of obstacles, 
barriers or constraints.”). 
 363 See supra notes 116–120 and accompanying text (discussing the negative right to be free 
from execution). 
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analogy forward, the condemned does not ask to be protected by the State 
from deadly motorists, lethal drugs, or toxic emissions; rather, the con-
demned asks to be protected from the State, which is the deadly force.364 
                                                                                                                           
 364 Invalidation of the death penalty on right-to-life grounds could, perhaps paradoxically, fortify 
abortion rights by acknowledging the inherent risks to life that pregnancy and childbirth impose on 
women. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., MATERNAL MORTALITY (Feb. 16, 2018), http://www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/maternal-mortality [https://perma.cc/2EB7-88GF] (discussing ma-
ternal mortality); see also Patty Skuster, How Laws Fail the Promise of Medical Abortion: A 
Global Look, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 379, 382 (2017) (“[D]enial of abortion often leads to ma-
ternal mortality and morbidity, which in turn constitutes a violation of the right to life.” (quoting 
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to 
Sexual and Reproductive Health (Article 12), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (May 2, 2016))); 
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have increased. See Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Focus on Infants During Childbirth Leaves 
U.S. Moms in Danger, NPR (May 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/527806002/focus-
on-infants-during-childbirth-leaves-u-s-moms-in-danger [https://perma.cc/5YHZ-GSS4] [herein-
after U.S. Moms] (finding that, between 1990 and 2015, more American women died “of pregnan-
cy-related complications than any other developed country[, and o]nly in the U.S. has the rate of 
women who die been rising.”). The number of pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of U.S. 
women has nearly tripled over the past thirty years, climbing steadily from 7.2 deaths per 100,000 
in 1987, to 18.0 deaths per 100,000 in 2014. Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/
pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm [https://perma.cc/U64C-HZ5S] (last updated Aug. 
7, 2018) [hereinafter Pregnancy Mortality] (examining deaths of women while pregnant and with-
in one year of the end of a pregnancy).  
 Each year between seven hundred to nine hundred women in the United States die from preg-
nancy or childbirth-related causes, and approximately sixty-five thousand nearly die—“by many 
measures, the worst record in the developed world.” U.S. Moms, supra. There is also a deeply trou-
bling complexion to these deaths: Black women (who are statistically more likely than white women 
to have an abortion) are nearly four times more likely than white women to die because of pregnancy 
or childbirth. See Pregnancy Mortality, supra; see also U.S. Moms, supra (“[M]aternal mortality is 
significantly more common among African-Americans . . . .”); News Release, Abortion Is a Common 
Experience for U.S. Women, Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 19, 
2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-women-
despite-dramatic-declines-rates [https://perma.cc/W2AG-L4MG] (summarizing a report finding 
wide variance in abortion rates based on race and ethnicity). Black lives matter in every context, 
and this is one of them. See Katie Mitchell, An Open Letter to the White Protester Outside the 
Abortion Clinic Who Told Me “Black Lives Matter,” Rewire.News (Oct. 13, 2017), https://rewire.
news/article/2017/10/13/open-letter-white-protester-outside-abortion-clinic-told-black-lives-matter/; 
Black Mamas Matter Alliance & Center for Reproductive Rights, Black Mamas Matter, Advanc-
ing the Human Right to Safe and Respectful Maternal Health Care (2018), https://www.
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/USPA_BMMA_Toolkit_Booklet-
Final-Update_Web-Pages.pdf (“Black women in Southern states face some of the highest risks for 
poor maternal health outcomes and care.”). 
 If a state were to force a woman—particularly a black woman—to carry a child to term by 
banning abortion, and if she were to die because of a complication that was undetected or unde-
tectable (and therefore not sufficient to trigger a medical exception to the abortion ban), the State 
may well have deprived her of the right to life. Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 830 (“[I]n 
evaluating whether there is a violation of a right[, the Supreme Court] considers ‘[t]he directness 
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CONCLUSION 
For over forty years, the Supreme Court has held fast to its conclusion 
in Gregg v. Georgia that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. In 2015, many observers, including 
conservative jurist Antonin Scalia, believed that the Court was prepared to 
reverse course, but the election of Donald Trump proved otherwise. The 
vision of judicial abolition was a mirage. 
Although the Eighth Amendment still has important work to do in this 
context, this Article has suggested a new path toward abolition: substantive 
due process. Applying the four factors that guide the Supreme Court’s sub-
stantive due process inquiry, this Article has argued that the death penalty 
infringes the condemned’s fundamental right to life, and the State cannot 
meet its burden of proving that the death penalty is narrowly tailored to 
achieve deterrence or retribution. Notwithstanding reasonable arguments to 
the contrary, this Article has argued that the right-to-life challenge is not 
inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment’s text or a woman’s privacy. 
As the Court stated in Obergefell v. Hodges, when “new insight reveals 
discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal 
stricture,” the Court must address that discord.365 Here, the conflict is plain: 
the right to life and the death penalty exception. When the Court takes up this 
issue, it should conclude that the death penalty, “once thought necessary and 
proper,” now “stands condemned as fatally offensive” to the right to life.366 
                                                                                                                           
and substantiality of the interference.’” (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 
(1978))). 
 365 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015). 
 366 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 
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